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ABSTRACT

Independent Counsel:
Process and Policy
by
Sheri Michele Schwartz
Dr. Jerry Simich, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Independent Counsel: Process and Policy examines the Office o f the Independent
Counsel, established by the Ethics in Government Act o f 1978. It discusses the history o f
the Act, its implementation, and its application. Although there is a need for independent
investigation of high-level government officials, the Act suffers from major defects
which damage its credibility in accomplishing the goals Congress set with its passage.
Independent Counsel: Process and Policy suggests changes to the Act which will
increase the efficiency and fairness o f the office, and encourage efforts to eradicate the
public’s perception of the independent coimsel as a renegade.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The Independent Counsel is wholly free o f presidential control and
virtually impervious to dismissal; he is accountable only to his own
conscience.
“Starr: Relentless or Reluctant?"^
“The Escalating War Between the President and Independent Counsel"^
“The Last Starr Fighter?"^
The headlines become more outrageous as the days pass. Within a matter
of months. Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr has become the subject o f a storm o f
publicity and controversy over his tactics in investigating the relationship between the
President o f the United States and a White House intern. Although subject to criticism
over the Whitewater investigation, which has been ongoing since 1994, Starr’s actions
have never been as prominent. Concurrently, the country’s attention has focused on the
statute which gives Starr so much power, the Independent Counsel Act, a provision o f the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Almost daily, commentators opine on the efficacy
and constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act, and engage in heated debate over
whether it should be modified or repealed.
Erik Luna, Imbalance o f Power, Los Angeles Daily Journal, February 26, 1998,6.
Ruth Marcus, Relentless or Reluctant, Washington Post, January 30,1998, A l.
Senator Arlen Spector, The Escalating War Between the President and
Independent Counsel, Congressional Record, March 2, 1998, si 195-sl 197.
Amy Keller, The Last Starr Fighter?, Roll Call, March 2,1998, 2.
I
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This thesis examines the statute, its history, scope, constitutionality and
policy implications, as well as the attacks leveled against the law and its appointees. The
Office o f the Independent Counsel has significant power, but not unlimited power. It
serves a purpose which no other government office can serve: to independently
investigate alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking government officials without a conflict
of interest. While many argue otherwise, this thesis takes the position that the
Independent Counsel is a necessary check on the power o f the Executive Branch and
should be maintained.

History
The law commonly referred to as the Independent Counsel Act was
enacted as part o f the Ethics in Government Act o f 1978 (“The Act”). It was the first
statute providing for a court-appointed Independent Counsel. However, it is not the first
time independent investigators have been appointed in response to allegations o f
malfeasance. It is also not the only way to investigate malfeasance in government office.
There are many examples of the President and/or Congress taking it upon himself or itself
to investigate allegations of wrong-doing.
In the two hundred years before the enactment of the Ethics in
Government Act o f 1978, the Executive Branch was responsible for responding to
charges of its own malfeasance. One writer terms this the “politics o f ethics.”^ In
fashioning the unitary executive, it is argued, the Founders believed a single executive
would be more accountable to the people for both his conduct and his administration’s
conduct. Further, the President is obligated under Article II, Section 3 o f the Constitution
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Thus, the President, by design and

^

T e r^ Eastland, Ethics, Politics and the Independent Counsel, (Washington, D C.:
National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1989), 1.
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constitutional mandate, is obligated to investigate charges or appoint others to investigate
charges against his administration.*
The President himself has been directly involved in investigating such
allegations on at least two occasions. President Washington confronted his Secretary o f
State Edmund Randolph with evidence that he might have engaged in treasonous activity
with the French, after which Randolph resigned. ’ President Cleveland instructed his
Secretary o f the Interior to investigate his Attomey General for alleged conflicts o f
interest when the Attomey General’s office filed a lawsuit, the result o f which could have
increased the Attomey General’s financial portfolio by millions. The investigation
cleared the Attomey General o f any wrongdoing because he never actually authorized the
lawsuit.*
After the Justice Department was established in 1870. investigations were
usually conducted by its attomeys.’ For example, during the Garfield presidency in the
late 1800’s, the Justice Department investigated the “Star Route Frauds”, which involved
fraudulent contracts for mail delivery in rural areas. The investigation implicated
Stephen W. Dorsey, Secretary o f the Republican National Committee and Garfield’s
1880 campaign manager.'” During the Kennedy Administration, the Justice Department
investigated conflict o f interest charges against Secretary o f the Navy Fred Korth. During
the Nixon Administration, the Justice Department investigated allegations o f conspiracy,
extortion and bribery involving Vice-President Spiro Agnew. " Spiro Agnew resigned
and pled no contest to one count o f tax evasion in October, 1973. He was fined $10,000
Eastland, 2.
Eastland, 7.
Eastland, 7-8.
Although the office of the Attomey General was created in 1789, the Justice
Department was not created until 1870. Eastland, 8, n.2.
10

Eastland, 8.
Eastland, 8.
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and sentenced to three years o f unsupervised probation. The Attomey General
recommended no prison time as part of an agreement that Agnew would resign.'^
Congress has also responded to and investigated Executive Branch
misconduct. For example. Congress investigated a corruption charge made against
Alexander Hamilton. It investigated President Monroe twice for allegedly putting public
funds to private use. It investigated President Monroe’s Secretary o f the Treasury for
illegally managing public funds. Congress also investigated several officials in the
Jackson Administration for allegedly misusing public money, and President Buchanan
and his administration for bribery and corruption. More recently, it has Investigated
Secretary o f the Treasury Andrew Mellon, President Hoover’s Postmaster General,
President Truman’s top military aide in the White House, and President Eisenhower’s
chief aide.'^ Congress has just completed an investigation o f the Intemal Revenue
Service and is currently investigating campaign finance irregularities in the Democratic
Party.
As for Special Prosecutors, at least six have been appointed prior to the
enactment o f the Independent Counsel Act. The first one was appointed during President
Ulysses S. Grant’s term in 1875. President Grant’s personal secretary was investigated
for accepting bribes from moonshiners cheating revenue laws.'"* Grant subsequently fired
the Special Prosecutor for being too aggressive in his investigation.” The second and
third Special Prosecutors were appointed during Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration.
In 1902, Francis Heney was appointed to prosecute a land fraud ring implicating the
former Commission o f the General Land Office. In 1903, Charles Bonaparte was
12
13
14

United States v Agnew, 428 F Supp 1293, 1294 (DMd 1974).
Eastland, 9-11.
Robert G. Solloway, TTte Institutionalized Wolf: An Analysis o f the
Unconstitutionality o f the Independent Counsel Provisions o f the Ethics in
Government Act o f 1978, 21 Indiana Law Review 955, 956 (1988).
Eastland, 14.
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appointed to investigate charges o f corruption in the Post Office that implicated an
Assistant Attomey General.'* Two Special Prosecutors were appointed by President
Coolidge and confirmed by the Senate to investigate the Teapot Dome Scandal. One was
a Republican and one a Democrat.'^ During the Truman Administration, the Attomey
General appointed a “Special Assistant” to investigate corruption in the Justice
Department. When the Special Assistant asked for the Attomey General’s files, he was
fired. The Attomey General was subsequently fired.'*
Prior to the Independent Counsel Act, both the President and Congress had
occasion to investigate members o f the Executive Branch, with a variety o f results. Some
officials were cleared, others were fired, tried and convicted, others resigned. Despite the
results, investigations were conducted and the public was informed. The public could
then choose whether to hold the President accountable for the alleged wrong-doing.
When the President did not aggressively pursue investigation. Congress often stepped in
and did so, informing the public o f the President’s failure to take action. Again, the
public had its choice. This process significantly changed with the enactment of the
Independent Counsel Act.
Title VI of The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 592-599, ("The
Act”) was first passed in 1978. The purpose o f The Act was to establish a neutral
procedure for resolving the conflict o f interest that arises when the Attomey General must
decide whether to pursue allegations o f wrongdoing leveled against high-ranking federal
officers, which will typically be the Attomey General’s close political associates.'”

'*

Eastland, 8.
Eastland, 8. This was the first and only time a special prosecutor has been
confirmed by the Senate.

'*

Solloway, 956.

'”

Banzhafv Smith, 737 F2d 1167,1168 (DC Cir 1984).
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The impetus o f The Act was President’s Nixon’s handling o f the Special
Prosecutor investigating the Watergate scandal, Archibald Cox '” When the Watergate
scandal broke. President Nixon asked his Attomey General designee, Eliot Richardson, to
appoint a Special Prosecutor if he deemed it necessary in order to conduct an impartial
investigation. On May 25, 1973, Richardson appointed Archibald Cox. But when Mr.
Cox insisted that the President tum over notes, tapes, and memos o f conversations, the
President ordered the Attomey General to remove Mr. Cox. The Attomey General
refused and subsequently resigned. The Deputy Attomey General was also ordered to
remove Mr. Cox and refused. He was dismissed from office, after attempting to resign.
Finally, Acting Attomey General Robert Bork relieved Cox o f his duties. At the same
time, Cox’s offices were sequestered by federal agents. The incident was termed the
“Saturday Night Massacre.”*'
As one article comments;
In Title VI o f the Ethics in Government Act o f 1978, Congress
institutionalized the historic political decision made after President Nixon
ordered the dismissal o f Archibald Cox and sequestered his downtown
Washington offices. In the shock o f that moment, the American public got
a taste o f what it would be like to live in a country where their ruler is
above the law. They reacted with rare swiftness, clarity, and force. The
political message was unambiguous—the Watergate investigation was to
proceed, and to proceed outside the control o f the President and the
Attorney General. Simultaneously, the people sent another instruction to
their representatives: find a practical, orderly way—short of impeachment
or a Watergate-style political convulsion—to assure that future Presidents
could not place themselves or their close aides above the law.’*

20

The Nixon administration precipitated several Congressional efforts to reign in
executive power: the War Powers Resolution o f 1973, the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments o f 1974, and the Presidential Recordings and
Materials Preservation Act o f 1974. Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel
Mess, 102 Harvard Law Review 105,107-108 (1988).

21

Constance O ’Keefe and Peter Safirstein, Fallen Angels, Separation o f Powers, and
the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination o f the Practical, Constitutional,
and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions o f the Ethics in
Government Act, 49 Brooklyn Law Review 113, 114-119 (1982).

22

Simon Lazarus and Jane E. Larson, The Constitutionality o f the Independent
Counsel Statute, 25 American Criminal Law Review 187 (1987).
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Subsequently, the Office o f the Independent Counsel was first proposed in
the Senate in 1974. Committees in the House and Senate conducted hearings in 1975,
which continued and culminated in The Act’s enactment in 1978.*^ During the
Congressional hearings, the proposed legislation seemed to gamer widespread support in
the legal community, including the American Bar Association, legal scholars, and public
interest groups.’" Congress provided that The Act would expire in five years. It has been
reauthorized three times since, in 1983,1987, and 1994.
Since 1978, at least 18 Independent Counsels have been appointed to
investigate allegations o f drug use, perjury, bribery, conflicts o f interest, financial
improprieties, lying, and abuse of executive power, at a total cost o f about $115 million.”
O f the investigations, the one which has consumed the most resources is Lawrence
Walsh’s investigation o f the Iran-Contra affair, at a total cost o f about $47.4 million.” O f
those prosecuted by Walsh, four were convicted (two o f those overturned), seven pled
guilty, and six were given presidential pardons.” After Walsh’s investigation, Arlin
Adams’ investigation o f Samuel Pierce and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development cost about $27.1 million and resulted in seven guilty pleas, eleven
convictions, and one acquittal.”

Kenneth Starr’s investigation o f Clinton and the

Whitewater matter is growing and will surpass Adams’ investigation, at a total cost of
$25.6 million as of June, 1997, resulting thus far in at least six guilty pleas and three
convictions.”
23

North V Walsh, 656 F Supp 414,416 (DDC 1987).

24

Ibid.

25

Honorable Harvie Wilkinson III and Honorable T.S. Ellis 111, The Independent
Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed? 54 Washington &
Lee Law Review 1515,1523 (1997).

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid.
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Scope
Under The Act, the Independent Counsel investigates and prosecutes
certain high-ranking government officials, if prosecution is warranted. High-ranking
officials include the President and Vice-President, cabinet officials, high-level
presidential aides, the Attomey General, high-level assistant attorneys general, the
director and deputy director o f the CIA, presidential campaign officials, and the
commissioner of Intemal Revenue.” Other persons, including members o f Congress,
may also be investigated under certain conditions.
The investigation begins when the Attomey General receives information
sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether a covered official may have
violated any Federal Criminal law (other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or an
infraction). Once the Attomey General receives this information, she has 30 days in
which to determine whether there are grounds to investigate.” In making this
determination, she shall only consider (A) the specificity o f the information received; and
(B) the credibility of the source o f the information.” If within the 30-day period, the
Attomey General determines that the information is not specific or is not from a credible
source, then the Attomey General shall close the matter. If she finds to the contrary, she
shall commence a preliminary investigation. If she cannot determine whether the
30

28 u s e 591(b)(West 1998 supp).

31

28 u s e § 591(c)(West 1998 supp). An example o f a person who was not
enumerated under the statute, but prosecuted, is Jim Guy Tucker, former govemor
o f Arkansas. He was prosecuted with respect to his relationship to the failure of
the Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan, as part o f the Whitewater prosecution.
As Govemor o f Arkansas, Mr. Tucker was not among the enumerated persons in
the statute, but was nevertheless prosecuted by the Independent Counsel because
o f his relationship to the ongoing investigation o f enumerated persons. US v
Tucker, 73 F3d 1313 (8th Cir 1996).

32

28 u s e § 591(d)(2).

33

28 u s e § 591(d)(l)(W est supp 1998).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9
information is specific and credible, she shall commence a preliminary investigation with
respect to that information.” If the information concerns the Attomey General or a
person who has a personal or financial relationship with the Attomey General, she must
recuse herself and the next most senior Justice official must perform her duties under the
statute.”
Once the Attomey General begins her preliminary investigation, she has
90 days in which to determine whether further investigation is warranted.” When she has
completed the investigation, or 90 days has elapsed, she reports to a panel o f three judges,
referred to as the Special Division.” If the Attomey General determines there are no
further grounds for investigation, she informs the panel and no Independent Counsel is
appointed. The Attomey General’s decision is not reviewable by any court.” If the
Attomey General determines that further investigation is proper or has not made a
determination and filed a notification by the time deadline, she must apply to the Special
Division for the appointment o f an Independent Counsel.” The application must contain
information to help the Special Division to choose an Independent Counsel and define his
34

28 u s e § 591(d)(2)(West supp. 1998).

35

28 u s e § 591(e). In USvM cDougal, 906 F.Supp 499 (EDArk 1996), Attomey
General Janet Reno referred the investigation o f the Whitewater matter to an
Independent Counsel based on a political conflict o f interest for the Justice
Department. Susan McDougal, the subject o f an investigation in the Whitewater
matter, challenged the appointment on the grounds that Reno did not file a notice
o f recusal. The court held that a political conflict o f interest did not require a
written notice o f recusal, whereas a financial or personal conflict would, thus the
appointment was proper.

36

28 u s e § 592(a)(1).

37

The Special Division has authority under 28 USC § 49. It is a three-judge panel
o f circuit justices appointed by the Chief Justice o f the United States. The justices
serve 2-year terms. One justice must come from the District o f Columbia Circuit,
and no two judges may be appointed from the same circuit.

38

28 USC § 592(f). US v Tucker, 78 F3d 1313 (8th Cir 1996). See also Dellums v
Smith, 797 F2d 817 (9th Cir 1986)(private citizens have no standing to challenge
attomey general’s decision in recommending or failing to recommend
independent counsel).

39

28 USC § 592(c).
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jurisdiction, “so that the Independent Counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate
and prosecute the subject matter and all matters related to that subject matter.""*
The Special Division then appoints the Independent Counsel and defines
his jurisdiction."' The Independent Counsel should be “an individual who has
appropriate experience and who will conduct the investigation and any prosecution in a
prompt, responsible, and cost-effective maimer.""^ The Special Division defines the
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, and is charged with assuring that he has “adequate
authority to fully investigate and prosecute the subject m atter... and all matters related to
that subject matter.""^ The jurisdiction also includes the authority to investigate and
prosecute Federal crimes, other than those classified as Class B or C misdemeanors or
infractions, that may arise out o f the investigation or prosecution o f the matter with
respect to which the Attomey General’s request was made, including perjury, obstmction
o f justice, destruction o f evidence, and intimidation o f witnesses."" This provision, as
well as related provisions dealing with the scope o f the Independent Counsel’s authority,
is the subject of numerous challenges."^
If the Attomey General so requests, the Special Division may expand an
existing Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, rather than appoint a new Independent
Counsel. The Attomey General may receive information about a potential investigation
40

28 USC § 592(d).

41

28 USC § 593(b)(1).

42

28 USC § 593(b)(2).

43

28 USC § 593(b)(3). See U SvSecord, 725 FSupp 563 (DDC 1989), in which
defendant Secord moved to dismiss indictments against him based on lack o f
prosecutorial jurisdiction. Defendant’s alleged crimes o f perjury before Congress
were committed after the Independent Counsel was appointed. The court held
that the scope o f the jurisdictional order “to seek indictments and to prosecute any
persons or entities involved in any o f the foregoing events or transactions” [IranContra] was broad enough to include defendant’s alleged perjury before Congress.

44

28 USC § 593(b)(3).

45

In one case. In re Espy, 80 F3d 501 (DC Cir 1996), the court commented that 43
motions challenging the scope of the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction had
already been filed during the investigation.
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independently and make the determination whether to submit it to the Special Division,
or the Independent Counsel may submit a request to the Attomey General asking for
expansion o f jurisdiction, if he finds information about persons not covered in the grant
o f jurisdiction violating criminal laws."* If the Independent Counsel requests expansion
o f his jurisdiction, the Attomey General shall give great weight to his
recommendations."’ Again, if the Attomey General decides not to submit the expansion
o f the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction to the Special Division, it is not reviewable. If
she does submit the request, the Special Division then expands the Independent Counsel’s
jurisdiction."*
In addition to appointing a counsel and defining his jurisdiction, the
Special Division also has the duty o f awarding attomey s’ fees to persons who were the
subject o f investigation, but did not get indicted. The fees must be reasonable, must have
been incurred during the investigation, and must be fees which would not have been
incurred but for the requirements o f The Act."’ This provision o f The Act is strictly
constmed,” making it difficult to obtain attomeys’ fees. The “but for” requirement is
satisfied when either 1) the subject o f the investigation is prejudiced by the Department o f
Justice’s failure to comply with substantive protective features o f The Act; 2) the
Independent Counsel's investigation constituted a substantial duplication o f prior
investigations; or 3) the case could have been disposed o f at an earlier stage if the
Attomey General had not been limited by the statutory restrictions on her preliminary

46

28 USC § 593(c).

47

28 USC § 593(c)(2). When the Independent Counsel submits information to the
Attomey General about persons not covered by the original order granting
jurisdiction, the Attomey General must follow the procedure set out in 28 USC
§ 592. In re Meese, 907 F2d 1192 (DC Cir 1990).

48

28 USC § 593(c)(2)(C).

49

28 USC 593(f)(West supp 1998).

50

In re Nofaiger, 925 F2d 428 (DC 1991).
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investigation, resulting in the appointment o f an Independent Counsel.” Despite this
high standard, the Special Division has awarded fees in proper circumstances.”
Once appointed, the Independent Counsel has full power and independent
authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers o f the
Department of Justice, the Attomey General, and any other officer or employee o f the
Department of Justice, including conducting grand jury proceedings, engaging in civil
and criminal litigation, appealing any decision in which he participates, reviewing
documentary evidence from any source, contesting privileges, receiving and challenging
national security clearances, determining immunity, subpoenaing tax retums, and
initiating and conducting indictments and prosecutions.” The Independent Counsel’s
power is the subject of many attacks, as it is “both wide in perimeter and fuzzy at the
borders."” The attacks often focus on the power conferred under 28 U.S.C. § 594 to refer
to the Independent Counsel other matters related to his jurisdiction, which can
significantly broaden the matters and/or persons being investigated. In a referral case, the
Independent Counsel can request referral of a related matter directly from the Special
Division.” The Attomey General need not concur for the Special Division to approve the
referral.” Relatedness depends on the procedural and factual link between the
Independent Counsel’s original prosecutorial jurisdiction and the matter sought to be
Ibid. at 438-39.
52

See In re Mullins, 87 F3d 1372 (DC Cir 1996)(Former President Bush’s
conununications assistant reimbursed for fees incurred as a result o f investigation
into government inquiries into presidential candidate’s citizenship status during
Vietnam.) In re Meese, supra (reasonable fees awarded).
28 USC §§ 594(a)(l)-(10).

54

US V Wilson, 26 F3d 142 (DC Cir 1994)(Independent Counsel Arlin Adam’s
investigation o f Housing S e c r e t^ Pierce which consensually overlapped with
Department of Justice investigation held not to exceed its jurisdiction.
Overlapping investigations held permissible, as long as Department o f Justice
does not subvert Independent Counsel’s investigation).

55

28 USC § 594(e).

56

In re Espy, 80 F3d 501,507 (DC Cir 1996).
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referred.” During the investigation, the Independent Counsel must comply with the
policies o f the Department o f Justice and has full authority to dismiss matters within his
jurisdiction.’*
The Independent Counsel receives a goverrunent salary, an office, and
many resources. He is entitled to hire employees, including attomeys, investigators, and
consultants, and may request assistance from the Department o f Justice in carrying out his
functions. With resources, come cost controls. The Independent Counsel is required to
conduct all activities with due regard for expense, authorize only reasonable and lawful
expenditures, and assign the duty o f certifying all expenditures to one employee.”
The Independent Counsel must file three types o f reports. Every six
months he must file a report summarizing major expenses and estimating future
expenses,** which is audited and/or reviewed by the Comptroller General.*' Every year
he must submit a report to Congress detailing all activities and giving the status of
investigations or prosecutions.*’ Finally, before the termination o f his office, he must file
a final report setting forth a description o f his work, including the disposition o f all cases
brought.*’ The final report, as well as intermediate reports and court filings, may be
publicly disclosed under certain circumstances.*"
57

Ibid.

58

28 USC § 594(e).

59

28 USC § 594(1).

60

28 USC 594(h)(1)(A).

61

28 USC § 596(c).

62

28 USC § 595(a)(2)(West supp 1998).

63

28 USC § 594(h)(1)(B).

64

The determination o f whether the report or filings will be made public considers
1) whether the subjects o f the investigation have already been disclosed; 2)
whether or not the subjects object; 3) whether the report or filings contain
information already known; and 4) whether the report or filings consist o f legal
and factual rulings which should be publicly available to understand the court’s
rules and precedents. In re North, 16 F3d 1234 (CADC 1994)(allowing
publication o f Iran Contra Final Report).
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An Independent Counsel’s tenure is terminated in one o f two ways.
Unless he is impeached and convicted, the Independent Counsel may be removed from
office only by the Attomey General for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any
condition which substantially impairs his performance.*’ If the Attomey General
removes the Independent Counsel, she must submit a report to the Special Division, and
the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate.” The Independent Counsel may seek
judicial review o f his removal.”
The second way is by termination o f the investigation. The Independent
Counsel may terminate the investigation by notifying the Attomey General and filing the
final report.** The Special Division may also terminate the investigation on its own
motion or by request o f the Attomey General by determining that all prosecutions or
investigations are substantially completed.*’ The Department o f Justice may then assume
responsibility for the remainder of the work. If the Attomey General does not make this
request, the Special Division shall determine on its own motion whether termination is
appropriate under this paragraph no later than 2 years after the appointment o f an
Independent Counsel, at the end of the succeeding 2 year period, and thereafter at the end
o f each succeeding 1 year period.™
Although minimized in the media. Congress does have oversight o f the
Independent Counsel and the Independent Counsel must cooperate in the exercise o f that

65

28 USC § 596(a)(1).

66

28 USC § 596(a)(2).

6?

28 USC § 596(a)(3).

68

28 USC § 596(b).

69

In In re North, 10 F3d 831 (DC Cir 1993), a suggestion to review the Independent
Counsel’s tenure was made by President Reagan’s lawyers. The Special Division
considered the request and issued an Order to Show Cause to Independent
Counsel Walsh why the investigation should not be terminated.

70

28 USC § 596(b)(2)(West supp 1998). This provision was added by the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act o f 1994.
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oversight.” Further, the Independent Counsel must advise the House o f Representatives
o f any “substantial and credible information which such Independent Counsel receives, in
carrying out the Independent Counsel’s responsibilities under this chapter, that may
constitute grounds for an impeachment.
The foregoing has shown that the Independent Counsel Act does confer
significant power on the appointee. The next chapter discusses the constitutionality of
The Act as a whole and the specific provisions which have been unsuccessfully
challenged.

”

28 USC § 595.
28 USC § 595(c). Neither the Special Division nor the Independent Counsel has
the authority to impeach anyone; if the Independent Counsel receives information
that may constitute grounds for impeachment, he is to advise the House of
Representatives. In re Visser, 968 F2d 1319, 1322 (1992).
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CHAPTER 2

CONSTITUTIONALITY

Virtually every article that discusses the Independent Counsel asks
whether the Independent Counsel Act is constitutional. It is. In Morrison v Olson, the
Supreme Court held that the Independent Counsel Act violated neither the Appointments
Clause, Article III, nor the separation o f powers doctrine.’^ Justice Scalia filed the only
dissent and Justice Kennedy took no part in deciding the case. Many have criticized the
Court’s opinion. Constitutional scholars found it a surprising decision, in which the
Court departed from its usual pattern o f examining constitutional history for guidance. In
Morrison v Olson, critics argue, the Court treated constitutional history as virtually
irrelevant and subordinated it to policy concerns, which earlier decisions had ignored.^'*
Morrison v. Olson was, at heart, a political dispute. Two subcommittees
of the House o f Representatives subpoenaed documents from the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) regarding the enforcement o f Superfund laws. The President,
on the advice o f the Justice Department, instructed the EPA to invoke executive privilege
on certain sensitive documents. The House o f Representatives then held the EPA
Administrator in contempt for claiming executive privilege, after which the EPA and the

73

Morrison v Olson, 108 SCt 2597 (1988).

74

Carter, 110. Citing cases such as INS v Chadha, 462 US 919 (1983), and Buckley
V Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976), which held laws unconstitutional based on the framers’
intent to separate the powers o f the branches. Carter calls the Morrison opinion
startling. “A little constitutional language, no constitutional history, a dash o f
deference, and the case is done.”
16
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United States filed suit against the House o f Representatives. The parties settled the
matter until the following year, when the House o f Representatives started investigating
the Justice Department’s role in advising the President to invoke executive privilege and
further accused certain individuals o f giving false and misleading testimony and
wrongfully withholding documents. The House o f Representatives sought appointment
of an Independent Counsel through proper channels, and one was appointed.^’ The
subjects o f the investigation challenged the appointment o f the Independent Counsel on
three constitutional grounds: the Appointments Clause, Article 111, and the separation of
powers doctrine. The Circuit Court declared the statute unconstitutional, and the
Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion.

The Appointments Clause
The Court first considered whether the appointment o f the Independent
Counsel violated the Appointments Clause o f the Constitution. The Appointments
Clause provides:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges o f the Supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment o f
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, or in the Courts o f Law, or in the Heads o f
Departments.’*
Since the Special Division has the power to appoint the Independent
Counsel, the Independent Counsel must be an inferior officer in order to satisfy the
Appointments Clause. If the Independent Counsel is a principal officer, then she must be
appointed by the President with the advise and consent o f the Senate.” The Court
”

Ibid., 2607.

’*

U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.

”

For purposes of appointments, the constitution divides officers into two classes:
principal and inferior. Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 508,509 (1976).
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determined that The Act did not violate the Appointments Clause because the
Independent Counsel was indeed an inferior officer. The Court cited four factors which
led to its conclusion that the Independent Counsel was an inferior officer.’*
The first factor was that the Independent Counsel is subject to removal by
a higher Executive Branch official. Although independent, the Independent Counsel may
be removed by the Attorney General. The fact that she may be removed indicates that she
is inferior in rank and authority to the Attorney General and the President.” Second, the
Independent Counsel is empowered to perform limited duties, although she has broad
discretion and power in exercising those duties. Nevertheless, she has no authority to
formulate policy and she has no duties outside o f her investigation.*® Third, the
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction is limited, both in the possible subjects o f
investigation and the scope conferred by the Special Division.*' Finally, the Independent
Counsel’s office is limited in tenure. Once the task is complete, the Independent
Counsel’s tenure is over, although there is no specified time limit.*’
In support o f its conclusion, the Court compared the Independent Counsel
to other inferior officers, citing several cases. The most notable is United States v
M xon," where the Court referred to the Watergate Special Prosecutor as a “subordinate
78

Ibid., 2608.

79

Morrison v Olson, 2608-09.

80

Ibid.

81

Ibid.

82

Ibid. Subsequent to Morrison, Congress amended the Ethics in Government Act
in 1994 to provide that if the Attorney General did not so request, the Special
Division could determine whether termination o f the Independent Counsel is
appropriate not later than two years after the appointment, at the end o f the next
two year period and thereafter every year. 28 USC § 596(b)(2). This amendment
was foimd constitutional in US v McDougal, 906 FSupp 494 (ED Ark 1995).
Although providing for review, the same conditions exist for termination: that all
investigations or prosecutions are substantially completed.

83

418 US 683, 694 (1974). In United States v Nixon, the Attorney General
conferred power and authority upon the Special Prosecutor by regulation. Under
Article II, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the
criminal litigation o f the United States. The Attorney General also has the power
...(continued)(continued... )
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officer.” Other inferior officers cited by the Court included: temporary vice-coimsels,*^
election supervisors,** and United States commissioners.**
The last Appointments Clause issue addressed by the Court was whether
the Special Division’s appointment o f the Independent Counsel was proper, since it was
an interbranch appointment. The language o f the Appointments Clause answers that
question in the affirmative, allowing Congress to vest the appointment o f inferior officers
in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads o f departments.*’ However, if one
branch’s appointment o f another branch’s officers had the potential to impair the
constitutional functions assigned to one o f the branches, it could violate the separation of
powers doctrine.** Here, the Court did not believe that allowing the Special Division to
appoint the Independent Counsel would impair the Special Division’s constitutional
functions. In fact, the Court reasoned, courts have appointed prosecutors*’ and U.S.
commissioners’®in other situations, therefore the interbranch appointment o f the
Independent Counsel was also proper.
...(continued)

to appoint subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge o f his duties. 28
u s e §§ 509, 510,515,533. The Special Prosecutor was one such subordinate
officer.
84

United States v Eton, 169 US 331 (1898).

85

Ex parte Siebold, 100 US (10 Otto) 371 (1880).

86

Go-Bart Importing Co. v United States, 282 US 344 (1931).

87

Challengers of the Act argued that even though Congress vested the appointment
o f inferior officers to either the President, the courts, or department heads, it
meant to limit the appointment o f inferior officers to the branch under which they
belong. The effect o f this argument is that only the President may appoint inferior
executive officers. The Court rejected this argument, claiming it had no support
in the Constitution. Two cases discuss this issue. In Ex Parte Hennen, 38 US (13
Pet.) 257-58, the Court stated “The appointing power here designated, in the latter
part o f the [Clause], was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department of
the government to which the officer to be appointed most appropriately
belonged.” In Ex Parte Siebold, supra, the Court said that rule stated in Hennen
was the usual and proper procedure, but not absolutely required.

88

Morrison v Olson, 2611.

89

Young V United States ex rel Viutton et Fils SA, 481 US 787 (1987).

90

Go-Bart Importing Co. v United States, 344.
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Although Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v Olson concentrated on
separation of powers arguments, he did address the Court’s Appointments Clause
arguments. He disagreed with the Court’s analysis o f the factors cited, disputing that the
Independent Counsel is removable at will, limited in power, limited in tenure, and limited
in jurisdiction. First, he argued the fact that the Independent Counsel is removable for
cause does not suggest that she is an inferior officer. Rather, the fact that the Independent
Counsel is harder to remove than principal officers (who are removable at will) supports
the contrary.” Second, he argued that the Independent Counsel is not limited in power
because it has the full power and authority o f the Department o f Justice, which is
substantial in scope.” Third, Justice Scalia attacked the Court’s characterization o f the
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction and tenure as limited. The Independent Counsel at
issue in Morrison v Olson had already served more than two years, longer than some
cabinet officials.” Since there are no limits on the length o f the Independent Counsel’s
investigation, there are no true limits on the tenure o f the office.
Instead o f the factors the Court considered in determining that the
Independent Counsel is an inferior officer, Scalia followed the test o f the Constitution
and the division of power it established. Scalia argued that the Independent Counsel is
not an inferior officer because she is not subordinate to any officer in the Executive
Branch.” Because the Independent Counsel is guaranteed independence, she is not
91

Ibid.

92

Ibid.

93

Ibid., 2633. Since Morrison v Olson, at least five Independent Counsels have had
investigations lasting three years or longer: Lawrence Walsh (Iran Contra),
Kenneth Starr (Whitewater), Donald Smaltz (Mike Espy), James Barrett (Henry
Cisneros), and Larry Thompson (Sealed). Wilkinson and Ellis, 1527.

94

In Edmond v US, 117 SCt 1573 (1997), Scalia wrote the opinion o f the court in a
case challenging the constitutionality o f the Secretary o f Transportation
appointing civilian judges to the Coast Guard Court o f Criminal Appeals. One o f
the issues was whether the civilian judges were inferior or principal officers.
Scalia cites the factors listed by the Court in Morrison v Olson, but states that the
court did not purport to set forth a test. Rather, the inquiry comes down to
whether or not the officer has a superior, which the civilian judges do. Justice
...(continued)(continued...)
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subordinate to either the President or the Attorney General. Therefore, her appointment
by anyone other than the President is unconstitutional.

Article III
The next issue addressed in Morrison v Olson was whether the powers o f
the Special Division violated Article III. Article III limits judicial power to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”’* Generally, executive or administrative duties o f a nonjudicial nature
may not be imposed on judges holding office under Article III.’* Since the Special
Division’s responsibilities under The Act include appointing the Independent Counsel,
defining her jurisdiction, granting extensions for investigations, receiving reports,
referring related matters, granting attorneys’ fees to individuals who are not indicted,
determining whether to grant protective orders, determining whether to release the final
report to the public, and terminating the Independent Counsel when her duties are
completed, there is an issue as to whether these duties exceed the bounds o f Article 111.
In analyzing the issue, the Court divided the Special Division’s duties into
three categories: appointment and jurisdiction, ministerial duties (receiving reports,
granting extensions, referring related matters, granting fees), and termination. With
regard to the first category, the Special Division is expressly given the power to appoint
the Independent Counsel by the Appointments Clause.” Consequently, the Court
reasoned, the Special Division must have some discretion in defining the scope o f the
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction, particularly where, as here. Congress created a

...(continued)

Souter concurred in the opinion, but did not agree that the consideration o f
whether the officer has a superior is sufficient to establish an inferior officer,
citing the remainder of the Morrison v Olson factors.
U.S. Constitution, Article III.
Buckley V Valeo, 123.
Morrison v Olson, 2612.
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temporary position whose duties vary with the factual circumstances.’* However, the
jurisdiction conferred by the Special Division must be demonstrably related to the factual
circumstances giving rise to the investigation and request for appointment.” As long as
the grant o f jurisdiction satisfies this condition, the power to define and expand the
Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction is incidental to the power to appoint, thus
constitutional.'®®
Second, the Court considered whether the administrative duties o f the
Special Division, such as receiving reports on various matters, granting attorneys’ fees
petitions, deciding to release the counsel’s final report and granting or denying protective
orders, violated Article III. In order to violate Article 111, these administrative duties
would have to either encroach upon executive or legislative authority, or be more
properly accomplished by those other branches.'®' In this case, the Court held that the
Special Divisions’ duties neither encroached upon executive or legislative authority or
were more properly accomplished by the other branches. These miscellaneous duties
were analogous to functions judges perform in other contexts and were simply
ministerial. Since these provisions o f The Act do not give the Special Division the power
to supervise the Independent Counsel in the exercise o f her investigative or prosecutorial
authority, they do not violate Article III.
Third, with regard to the power o f the Special Division to terminate the
duties of the Independent Counsel when it determines that the prosecutions are complete,
the Court expressed discomfort because termination in this manner is not a traditional
judicial power. Nevertheless, the Court did not view it as a significant judicial

’*

Morrison v Olson, 2613.

”

Ibid.

'°°

Morrison v Olson, 2613, fh. 17.

'®'

Ibid.

102

Ibid., 2614.
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encroachment upon executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the
Independent Counsel.'®* Further, the Court narrowed the interpretation o f The Act so that
the Special Division does not have the power to remove the counsel while an
investigation or court proceeding is still underway, a power which is vested solely in the
Attorney General. Termination may occur only when the counsel’s duties are completed
or so substantially completed that there remains no need for action.'®’' Consequently, the
Court did not believe that The Act violated Article III o f the Constitution.

Separation of Powers
The last challenge discussed by the Court, and the definitive one for
Justice Scalia, is that The Act violates the principle o f separation of powers because the
President neither has the power to remove or control the Independent Counsel, an
Executive Branch officer. The Majority admitted that the Independent Counsel was an
Executive Branch officer'®* and defined the separation o f powers analysis as ( 1) whether
the provision o f The Act restricting the Attorney General’s power to remove the
Independent Counsel to only those instances in which she can show “good cause”, taken
by itself, impermissibly interferes with the President’s exercise of his constitutionally
appointed functions; and (2) whether, taken as a whole. The Act violates the principle of
separation of powers by reducing the President’s ability to control the prosecutorial
powers wielded by the Independent Counsel.

Removal
The constitutional arguments challenging the President’s power to remove
the Independent Counsel are based on several major Supreme Court cases.
'®*

Ibid., 2614.

""

Ibid., 2615.

105

Morrison v Olson, 2619.
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In Myers v United S t a t e s the Court considered a law which allowed the
removal of certain postmasters by the President only with the advice and consent o f the
Senate. The Court issued a 70-page opinion, fully researched with many historical
references. It held that the statute was unconstitutional because Congress could not give
to itself the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise o f the power to
remove an Executive Branch official. Only the President may remove an Executive
Branch official.
Ten years later in Humphrey's Executor v United States,

the Court

considered a statute which limited the President's removal o f the Federal Trade
Commissioner only for malfeasance, neglect o f duty or inefficiency. The Court
determined that the Federal Trade Commissioner’s duties were quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial, rather than purely executive like the Postmaster in Afyer5.'“® Accordingly,
Congress may fix the period o f service and the conditions for removal in order to assure
discharge of the Commissioner’s duties independent o f Executive Branch control.'®’ In
essence, the Court held that the character o f the office will determine whether Congress
can condition the removal of an officer. If the office was not purely executive, then the
President’s removal power could be limited.
In Weiner v United5/a/« , "° decided in 1958, the Court addressed whether
the President had unfettered discretion to remove a member o f the War Claims
Commission, which had been established by Congress in the War Claims Act of 1948.
The Commission’s function was to receive and adjudicate certain claims for
compensation from those who had suffered personal injury or property damage at the

106

272 US 52(1926).

107

Humphrey’s Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935).

108

Ibid., 628.

109

Ibid., 630.

no

357 US 349(1958).
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hands o f the enemy during World War II. Commissioners were appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent o f the Senate, but the statute made no provision for
the removal o f officers, perhaps because the Commission itself was to have a limited
existence. As in Humphrey’s, however, the Commissioners were entrusted by Congress
with adjudicatory powers that were to be exercised free from executive control."'
Consequently, the Court held that the President did not have unfettered discretion to
remove such an official.
Finally, in Bowsher v Synar,

decided in 1986, the Court addressed

whether the powers vested in the Comptroller General under the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s power to
remove Executive Branch officers. Under that Act, the Comptroller General was required
to exercise executive functions."* Since the Comptroller General was removable only by
Congress, that Act gave Congress power over an official who was executing the laws,
which is a power that Congress cannot have under the Constitution. Since the
Constitution does not give Congress the power to execute the laws. Congress could not
grant that power to an officer under its control, and that provision o f the Act was deemed
unconstitutional."^
As shown, at least until Morrison v Olson, the constitutional analysis of
the President’s ability to remove a particular official revolved around that official's duties,
i.e. purely executive, quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, or somewhere in-between. After
reviewing the above cases, the Court in Morrison v Olson decided that the case before it
111

Weiner v United States, 356.

112

478 US 714 (1986).

113

The Comptroller General is an officer o f the United States who is nominated by
the President from a list o f three provided by the House o f Representatives.
He/She is confirmed by the Senate and removable only at the initiative o f
Congress. The office was established to be an office at the control o f Congress.
Ibid., 726.

114

Bowsher v Synar, 726.
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was neither like Bowsher nor Myers, where Congress had involved itself in the removal
o f an Executive Branch official. Here, the power to remove the Independent Counsel is
in the hands o f the Executive Branch, specifically the Attorney General, who may remove
the Independent Counsel for physical or mental disability, for good cause, or by
impeachment and conviction.
The Court found that this case was more aptly analogized to Humphrey's
and Weiner because in those cases the officials at issue were entrusted with powers which
were to be exercised free from executive control. However, the Court did not use the
quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial analysis to determine that the character o f the office of
the Independent Counsel was something other than purely executive,"* which would have
restricted the President’s removal power. Rather, the Court reasoned “that the
determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a “good cause
type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on
whether or not that official is classified as "purely executive.’""* The real question was
whether the removal restrictions were of such a nature that they impeded the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duties. Applying this analysis, the Court
recharacterized Humphrey's and Weiner, explaining that the distinctions based on the
(unctions o f the office were a reflection o f the importance o f the President’s ability to
remove the officials to his exercise o f constitutional duties. In sum, the Court changed
the analysis from concentrating on the type o f official (purely executive, quasi-legislative,
etc.) to analyzing the extent that the removal restriction impeded the President’s exercise
o f his constitutional duties.

IIS

116

The Court could not use this analysis in this case because the functions o f the
Independent Counsel, as admitted by the Court and supported by extensive case
law, are purely executive functions. The executive branch has the power to
enforce the law, and the duties of a prosecutor are the embodiment o f that power.
Morrison v Olson, 2618.
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Applying the reasoning to the case at issue, the Court considered the good
cause requirement for removing the Independent Counsel, and concluded that it by itself
did not “unduly trammel” on executive authority. Noting that the Independent Counsel is
an inferior officer, the Court stated “we do not see how the President’s need to control the
exercise o f that [the Independent Counsel’s] discretion is so central to the functioning of
the Executive Branch as to require as a matter o f constitutional law that the counsel be
terminable at will by the President.""’ In addition, since the President retains control
over the Independent Counsel through the Attorney General, he is not impermissibly
burdened in his power to control or supervise the Independent Counsel in the execution o f
her duties under The Act. Consequently, the removal restrictions under The Act were not
unconstitutional.

The Act as a Whole
The last issue the Court considered was whether The Act, taken as a
whole, violated the principle of separation o f powers by unduly interfering with the role
o f the Executive Branch. Although the three branches o f government do not and have
never been held to operate with absolute independence, if one branch is trying to increase
its power at the expense o f another, or one branch is usurping the power of another, it
may violate the separation o f powers doctrine, which is the basis for our system of
government."* Here, the Court held, neither Congress nor the Judiciary was trying to
increase its own power at the expense o f the Executive, nor was either usurping Executive
power, therefore The Act did not violate the separation o f powers principle.
In the case of Congress, Congress has very little role in the application o f
The Act. With the exception o f the power o f impeachment (which applies to all officers
o f the U.S.), Congress retained for itself no powers o f control or supervision over the
"’

Ibid., 2619.

"*

Ibid., 2620, citing United States v Nixon, 418 US 683,707 (1974).
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Independent Counsel."’ Congress may request the appointment o f a Counsel from the
Attorney General, but the Attorney General may refuse. Furthermore, Congress has
rights to information and oversight, but those are functions incidental to the legislative
function of Congress.'” Accordingly, Congress is not increasing its power at the expense
o f the Executive Branch.
Nor does The Act work any judicial usurpation of properly executive
function. Other than the powers o f appointment, discussed earlier, the court has no power
to supervise or control the activities of the counsel.” '
Finally, The Act does not impermissibly undermine the power o f the
Executive Branch or disrupt the proper balance between the coordinate branches by
preventing the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.'” Although it reduces the amoimt o f control and supervision that the Attorney
General and President exercise over the investigation and prosecution o f a certain class of
alleged criminal activity,'” the Attorney General has several ways to supervise or control
the powers o f the Independent Counsel. She may remove the Independent Counsel for
good cause, providing the President with substantial ability to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed by the Independent Counsel. She also controls the initial appointment
o f the Independent Counsel and to some extent, the definition o f his jurisdiction by
submitting certain facts to the Special Division. In addition, the requirement to abide by
Justice Department policy also acts as a control on the Independent Counsel.
Consequently, even though the Independent Counsel is free from executive supervision to
a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, these features o f The Act give the
119

Morrison v Olson, 2620.

120

Ibid., citing McGrain v Daugherty, 273 US 135,174 (1927).
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Morrison v Olson, 2621.

122

Ibid., 2621, citing Nixon v Administrator o f General Services, 433 US 425,443
(1977).
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Morrison v Olson, 2621.
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Executive Branch sufficient control over the Independent Counsel to ensure that the
President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.'”
Justice Scalia’s dissent concentrated on the principle o f separation o f
powers. His main argument is that once one determines that the conduct o f a criminal
investigation and prosecution is purely an executive power, then one must determine
whether The Act deprives the President o f exclusive control over the exercise o f that
power.'” He disagrees with the Majority’s analysis revolving around the extent that the
removal power impedes on the President’s exercise o f his duties. In his opinion, the
Independent Coimsel is a purely executive officer, thus he should be removable at will by
the President.
In support o f his alternative test, Scalia argues that the conduct o f a
criminal investigation and prosecution is purely an Executive Branch power, citing
several cases in support.'” Prosecutors make policy decisions in investigating crimes,
including deciding who to prosecute, which crimes to pursue, and how to use the
subpoena power. Taking supervisory power o f these activities away from the President
usurps the core o f the executive function.'” Because the Constitution grants all
Executive Power to the President, any distinction the Court makes as to how central the
need to control the Independent Counsel is to the President’s constitutional duties is
invalid to Justice Scalia.'”
Since prosecution is a purely Executive Branch function. Justice Scalia
argues, then the only relevant question to ask is whether the President has exclusive
124

Ibid., 2622.
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Ibid., 2626.
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Morrison, 2627. Governmental investigation and prosecution o f crimes is a
quintessentially executive function. Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 832 (1985);
Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 138 (1976); United States v Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,693
(1974).
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Ibid., 2628.
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Morrison, 2628 (dissent).
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control o f the prosecutor’s removal. Here, the President does not, thus The Act must
violate the separation o f powers doctrine.
Justice Scalia disagrees with the Majority’s contention that the President,
through the Attorney General, has control over the Independent Counsel. The good cause
restriction on removal serves more as an impediment to removal than as a control. The
discretion o f the Attomey General to request an appointment is not a control, as the Court
believes, but is so “insubstantial that the Attomey General’s discretion is severely
confined."'” When a request for appointment has come from Congress, the Attomey
general must explain any denial to the Congress. Practically, it would be surprising if the
Attomey General had any choice but to seek appointment o f an Independent Counsel to
pursue the charges, particularly where there is evidence against the person charged.
Further, once the referral is made, the Special Division determines the scope and duration
o f the investigation, not the Attomey General. Most importantly, once appointed, the
Independent Counsel exercises executive power free from the President’s control.'”
Since the President’s power to remove the Independent Counsel is so limited. The Act
violates the separation o f powers doctrine.
However, the purpose o f The Act wzis to curb the Executive’s power,
when investigating transgressions by those in his Administration. Should the President
still have such exclusive power, even when alleged crimes by him or his close associates
are at issue? In effect. Justice Scalia answers in the affirmative. It is a price we pay for
liberty, to preserve the separation o f powers and our system n f checks and balances.
Allowing the President to wield all o f the executive power, even when it involves
possible crimes committed by himself or those close to him is no different than when

'”

Morrison v Olson., 2627.
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Ibid., 2627.
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Congress exempts itself from laws it passes'*' or when the Supreme Court has the power
to pronounce the final decision on the constitutionality o f a statute reducing its salaries.'*’
The President’s power can be checked constitutionally by the power to impeach a
President who fails to enforce the laws. Further, there is a political check by the people
who elected the President. They may vote him out o f office.
Finally, Justice Scalia comments on the political effects o f The Act. It
chills speech between the President and his advisors if they have no protection. It allows
Congress to trigger an investigation rather than bring impeachment proceedings against a
President, proceedings which may hurt their political futures. The investigations
themselves become a source o f constant political damage and are widely publicized and
much too long.'** The Independent Counsel has immense power and the danger o f that
power combined with unlimited resources and a staff o f those devoted to the cause
without the political check o f removal by the President, creates a mini-executive: narrow,
focused and unlimited. “1 fear the Court has permanently encumbered the Republic with
an institution that will do it great harm."'*'*
In the years since Morrison v Olson, many have agreed with Justice
Scalia’s arguments. The dissent has been widely cited in articles that call for The Act’s
repeal. But the The Act is not likely to be overmled in the near future, since ten Justices
supported its constitutionality. It is up to Congress to determine the future o f The Act.

'*'

Justice Scalia cites the Civil Rights Act o f 1964, Title VII, 42 USC section 2000e
as an example.

'*’

United States v. Will, 449 US 200,211-217(1980).

'**
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CHAPTER 3

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

From its beginnings in the early 70’s, the Ethics in Government Act has
been controversial. The original act contained a sunset clause providing that The Act
would expire in December o f 1982. While Congress re-authorized The Act in 1983, and
again in 1987 and 1994, it has amended The Act in important ways in response to public
policy concerns raised by its application. This chapter examines many o f the changes
made and the impetus for such changes.
As previously discussed, the policy behind The Act is to ensure
independent investigation o f high-level executive officials. After Watergate, many
believed it made sense to separate the investigators from those being investigated, to
avoid the appearance o f impropriety and to ensure that the investigations would be fair
and impartial.'** However, perceived abuses precipitated amendments to The Act. The
1983 Amendments to The Act were influenced by the investigations o f three Carter
officials, Jordan, Kraft, and Donovan, none o f which resulted in criminal charges. Critics
alleged that The Act was too easily engaged and that the scope o f The Act was too broad,
thus the amendments changed the standard for commencing a preliminary investigation.
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While the Reagan Administration opposed The Act on constitutional and cost grounds, it
later dropped its opposition because the public still favored The Act.'”
In 1987, The Act was up for reauthorization and more than half a dozen
investigations had already been launched. Reagan Attomey General William French
Smith opposed reauthorization, claiming that the process o f Independent Counsel
investigation was “cmel and devastating in its application to individuals, falsely
destroying reputations and requiring the incurring o f great personal costs.”'*’ The second
Reagan Administration, with at least four pending investigations o f its advisers, launched
constitutional attacks on the bill, resulting in the Morrison v Olson Supreme Court
decision. Democrats, on the other hand, vigorously supported The Act in 1987. Leading
Senate Sponsor Carl Levin made comparisons between the pending investigations and
Watergate, claiming that The Act had restored public confidence in the criminal justice
system.'** The Act was reauthorized in 1987, with overwhelming support, and President
Reagan was forced to sign it. One day later, the Office o f the Independent Counsel
secured its first conviction under The Act, that o f Reagan official Michael Deaver, for
peijury.
The Bush Administration continued to assault The Act, but investigations
continued, including one o f Bush Defense Secretary Caspar Weinburger. In addition,
Lawrence Walsh continued what would be a seven-year investigation o f the Iran-Contra
Affair. The Act again expired at the end o f 1992, and it was in the hands o f the newlyelected Clinton Administration. Although warned by the outgoing administration, the
Clinton Administration believed in The Act and vowed to retain it. Shortly thereafter.
Republicans called for an Independent Counsel to investigate Clinton for unethical
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business dealings. Consequently, the Republicans, although they hated The Act, were in
a quandary about reauthorization.'” The Act prevailed, and was again reauthorized in
1994.
It is a foregone conclusion that if an administration is plagued by
Independent Counsel investigations, it is not likely to support reauthorization o f The Act.
However, opposing The Act is politically difficult, because it can make an administration
look like it has something to hide. Consequently, the alternative to repealing The Act is
to attack it, which has been the tactic o f every administration since The Act’s inception.
The attacks may not have caused the repeal o f The Act, but they have precipitated
important changes to it, specifically in the following areas:

Name
The Independent Counsel became known as such with the 1983
Amendments. Prior to 1983, he was known as the Special Prosecutor. In changing the
name. Congress sought to remove the stigma associated with the name Special
Prosecutor.'”

Standard for Preliminary Investigation and Request for Appointment
The amendments directed at the standards for preliminary investigation
and request for appointment were the most important. The current standard for
commencing a preliminary investigation requires the Attomey General to determine
within 30 days of receiving “sufficient information” if there are grounds to investigate a
covered official. In making the determination, she shall only consider 1) the specificity
o f the information received and 2) the credibility o f the source.''" However, the Attomey
'”

Ibid.

'40

O ’Keefe and Safirstein, 146.
28 USC §§ 591(d)(1) and (2).
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General cannot use the normal tools o f a prosecutor to do so: she cannot subpoena
records, she cannot use a grand jury, and she cannot give witness immunity."’ The
Amendments changed this inquiry in two ways.
First, prior to the 1994 Amendments to The Act, the Attomey General
only had 15 days to determine whether a preliminary investigation should be commenced.
The current standard gives the Attomey General 30 days, a reasonable period o f time to
review the allegations presented. Second, the standard for instituting a preliminary
investigation has been narrowed in scope. The original version o f the statute required the
Attomey General to conduct a preliminary investigation when the Attomey General
received “specific information” o f a violation o f any federal criminal law, other than a
petty offense. It did not define “specific information” and it did not give the Attomey
General much discretion in determining whether the information was credible. Specific
information could conceivably come from any source, as long as it was detailed. In
addition to considering the specificity o f the information, the Attomey General may now
also consider the credibility o f the source.
This change in The Act, made in 1983, was made in response to Attomey
General Benjamin Civiletti’s request for Independent Counsels to investigate Carter
Administration Official Hamilton Jordan and Campaign Manager Timothy Kraft. Jordan
was accused of using cocaine in a discotheque in 1978, and Kraft was similarly accused
of using drugs. The Attomey General had received reports of drug use from several
people who were the subject o f investigations by the Department o f Justice. After
preliminary investigations, he was compelled to appoint Independent Counsels in both
cases. Both were exonerated after investigation."*
Civiletti testified before the Senate that he would have neither commenced
a preliminary investigation nor appointed Independent Counsels had he been following
142
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standard Department o f Justice procedures rather than following the provisions o f The
Act. Since he had specific information about alleged drug use, he was compelled to
begin a preliminary investigation.'” Whereas Attomey General Civiletti was not
permitted to discount the credibility o f the sources, now the Attomey General may do so.
Similarly, the standard for requesting an Independent Counsel has
changed. The original Act made the request mandatory unless the matter under
investigation was “so unsubstantial” as to not warrant further investigation or
prosecution. Civiletti testified that he could not classify the allegations against Jordan
and Kraft as “so unsubstantial”, thus had to appoint Independent Counsels. The 1983
Amendments changed the standard to “there are no reasonable grounds to believe” that
further investigation or prosecution is warranted. It also added that the Attomey General
shall, in determining whether reasonable grounds exist to warrant further investigation,
comply with written or other established policies o f the Department o f Justice with
respect to the enforcement o f criminal laws.
As a policy matter, the Public Integrity Section o f the Criminal Division of
the Justice Department, the unit which reviews Independent Counsel requests, receives
several dozens allegations every year. For example, from 1987 to 1992, over 50 requests
were made. O f those requests, thirty-five preliminary inquiries were undertaken where it
was determined that the evidence was not sufficiently specific or credible to warrant a
preliminary investigation. In nine cases, there was specific and credible information as to
a covered person, but it was determined that no referral was appropriate because no
further investigation weis warranted. There were specific and credible allegations made as
to eight people who were not covered by The Act, but who were associated with a
covered person, such as a family member or a close business associate. O f these eight

...(continued)

"*
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allegations, initial inquires were undertaken and it was determined that they did not
justify a referral. Lastly, in five cases during this period, there were applications for an
Independent Counsel.”"*
It has been reported that Attomey General Janet Reno construes the
language o f The Act strictly, by gathering much more evidence than required to institute
a preliminary investigation.'” For example. Congressional Republicans requested that
Reno appoint an Independent Counsel for campaign finance reform issues. To date, she
has refused.'”

However, there is no shortage o f Independent Counsels investigating the

Clinton Administration. In May of 1998, Attomey General Reno decided to seek an
Independent Counsel to investigate allegations against Labor Secretary Alexis Herman.
Reno also appointed an Independent Counsel to investigate Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbit for allegedly lying to Congress about his role in rejecting a proposed Indian
casino. Other Clinton Administration officials who have been investigated by
Independent Counsels include: Henry Cisneros, Mike Espy, Ron Brown, and Clinton
himself.'”

Cost
The costs o f Independent Counsel investigations have escalated, ranging
from $3,300.00 to $47.4 million.'” The 1994 Amendments added provisions regarding
cost controls. None were present in the original statute. '*® These provisions require the
Independent Counsel to conduct activities with due regard for expense, authorize only
145
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reasonable and lawful expenditures, and assign a person to certify that the expenditures
are reasonable. Further, the Independent Counsel must comply with Department o f
Justice policies on expenditures unless inconsistent with purposes o f The Act. Expenses
are audited every six months. However, amendments also provided for travel expenses,
per diem fees, and subsistence expenses, subject to certain limits. Anyone who wrongly
certifies an expense is liable as other public officials are, but few if any limits are
imposed on the funds expended in an investigation. The reports on expenditures are
made public, but even public outcry does not compel the Independent Counsel to cut its
expenditures. On this front, the Independent Counsel is left to his own discretion.

Length and Termination
An Independent Counsel serves until his prosecution is complete or he is
removed from office. Prior to and including the 1983 Amendments, length o f office was
not a concern to Congress, because the three counsels who had served had all completed
their investigations in reasonable periods of time. Consequently, no changes were made
regarding the length of the Independent Counsel’s service. In 1994, The Act was
amended to require that if the Independent Counsel did not initiate termination himself
(because all prosecutions were substantially completed), the Attomey General could
initiate it or the Special Division, on its own motion, shall determine whether termination
is appropriate. The Special Division must do so no later than two years after appointment,
at the end of the next two year period, and at the end o f every-one year period
thereafter.
The Independent Counsel may be removed by impeachment and
conviction, by the Attomey General for good cause, physical or mental disability, or any
...(continued)

28 USC § 594(1).
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other condition that substantially impairs his performance. The good cause requirement
was added by the 1983 Amendments. Prior to good cause, the standard was extraordinary
impropriety. Extraordinary impropriety was not defined in The Act, but it was the same
standard under which the Watergate Prosecutor was appointed.'*’ In establishing the
good cause standard. Congress did not define good cause, but the Senate commented that
the standard should be interpreted in accordance with existing case law on the removal of
other officials who are subject to good cause removal. '** Neither did the Supreme Court
define good cause in Morrison v Olson. While it is true that other government agencies
have a good cause-type standard for removal, specifically the Federal Reserve, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the former Interstate Commerce Commission,'*^ there is
very little case law discussing what good cause means. The Federal Trade Commission
standard specifies cause as inefficiency, neglect or malfeasance, which has been held In
by the United States Supreme court to exclude removal on a whim.'** Consequently,
some commentators'** believe it is possible to interpret the standard broadly to encompass
a lot of conduct, but it has not yet been applied to any Independent Counsel.
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Attomey General Richardson chose to resign rather than fire Cox, contrary to the
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o f the Independent Counsel for a wide range o f conduct.
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Reports
The Independent Counsel is required to file a yearly report with Congress.
This requirement was added by the 1994 Amendments. The Act previously required the
Counsel to file reports when appropriate. The length and scope o f the investigations
presumably led to this change, as the investigations began to span several years and cost
millions. Congress needed to be periodically updated.'*’
In addition to yearly reports, the Independent Counsel must file a final
report. Prior to 1994, the report had to discuss a description o f work completed,
including the disposition o f any cases bought, and the reasons for not prosecuting any
matter within the prosecutorial jurisdiction o f the counsel. The 1994 Amendments
removed the requirement o f discussing the reasons for non-prosecution. Once the report
is filed, the attorneys for those investigated may obtain the portions o f the report dealing
with their clients. Any criticisms or responses the subject may have are attached to the
report as an appendix and then it is released publicly. In certain circumstances, the
report or portions o f it that are confidential will not be released.'** Some past
Independent Counsels, such as Lawrence Walsh and Jacob Stein, believe the reporting
requirement is necessary to justify expenditures and inform the public o f just what the
Independent Counsel has accomplished.'*’ Others, such as Larry Thompson, who
investigated the Department o f Housing and Urban Development, believe the report is
time-consuming, expensive, and wasteful.
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Reimbursement of Fees
The Act awards attorneys’ fees to those who are not indicted, a provision
which was added by the 1983 Amendments.'*” The grant o f fees may have been a result
o f the Jordan and Kraft investigations previously discussed, in which both incurred
enormous attorneys’ fees. Jordan is said to have incurred over $100,000 in legal fees,
more than twice his annual salary.'*' The 1994 Amendments qualified the award o f fees,
by making the applicant address whether the cost would have been incurred but for the
requirements of The Act. To recover fees, an applicant must show that ( 1) he is the
subject o f the investigation, (2) fees were incurred during the investigation, (3) fees
would not have been incurred but for the requirements o f The Act, and (4) fees are
reasonable. '*~ The Special Division publishes all fee applications, and substantial
amounts may be awarded. For example, the Special Division awarded Ronald Reagan
$562,111.08 out o f $777,651.79 requested for the Iran Contra Investigation, because
Independent Counsel Walsh reported that he did not have proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the President knew about the activities o f Oliver North.'*^ The Special
Division, when awarding fees, generally excludes fees incurred in communicating with
the media, because that is not a necessary expense incurred in defending a criminal
prosecution.'*^

Persons Covered By The Act
Each round o f amendments brought changes to the scope o f persons
covered by The Act. The President, Vice-President, Cabinet Officials, some deputy
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cabinet officials, the Director o f Central Intelligence, the 1RS Commissioner, and some
national campaign officials have always been covered. The 1983 Amendments narrowed
some of the executive officials to those within a certain pay scale. However, at one point
an amendment was proposed to extend coverage o f The Act to the presidential spouse,
children, and relatives. This was during the time that President Carter’s brother Billy was
somehow involved with the government o f Libya, commonly referred to as “Billygate”.'*’
The current statute also includes members o f Congress, but no Independent Counsels
have yet been appointed to investigate a member o f Congress. The current statute also
limits the scope o f The Act to one year after leaving the covered position. Previously,
The Act had tied coverage to when the President left office.'** The policy arguments for
restricting coverage of The Act continue and will be further addressed in a subsequent
chapter.

The foregoing has discussed the policy changes made in response to the
application o f The Act. The application o f The Act in the last few years has generated
additional arguments which will be discussed in Chapter 5. The next chapter discusses
several “hot” legal issues which have arisen in the course o f Independent Coimsel Starr’s
investigation o f the Clintons.

'*'
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CHAPTER4

HOT ISSUES

Independent Counsel Starr’s investigation o f the Whitewater land deal and
related matters has raised several legal issues which have become front page news: the
use o f executive privilege to keep advisors from answering relevant questions about the
Monica Lewinsky investigation, the scope o f governmental attorney-client privilege
relating to the same investigation, the confidentiality attributed to the secret servicepresidential relationship, and the scope o f the attomey-client privilege when the client is
deceased. One final issue is raised by the resolution o f all these privileges. If a sitting
President is guilty o f violating the law, may he be prosecuted? In a legal sense, these are
cutting edge issues which either push the boundaries o f existing law or are destined to
make new law. In a policy sense, these issues reflect normative considerations o f the
balance between the protection accorded our leaders and the information the public
deserves. Aside from the theoretical questions, these privilege issues vividly
demonstrate the defensive tactics o f an administration imder fire. Asserting a privilege is
one o f the most effective ways to delay an Independent Counsel’s investigation because it
takes time and resources to fight.
The Office o f the Independent Counsel is a legal entity. It pursues its
investigation by using the legal process and it prosecutes it claims in the court system,
using grand juries to indict its suspects. Under the United States Constitution, all those
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accused o f crimes and all those being investigated are entitled to due process.'*^ This
means that when subpoenaed, a party may object based on numerous grounds, privilege
included, and is entitled to a hearing on his objections. Whether or not the objection is
valid, the parties are required to file briefs and argue the merits o f the objection at a
hearing. This may take anywhere from ten to thirty days, depending on the type of
motion and the notice requirements. The lower court, generally a federal district court,
issues a ruling, which may not be immediate, adding anywhere from one to one hundred
twenty days to the process. If the administration loses a motion in the district court, it
may move for reconsideration before appealing the ruling, which may add an additional
ten to forty days to the process, to allow for briefing and argument. After the ruling on
the motion for reconsideration, the administration may then file an appeal, if it is not
happy with the ruling. The Independent Counsel may also file an appeal. In general, the
parties have additional time to file a notice o f appeal, and a briefing schedule is then set
by the court. The appellate process may take anywhere from thirty days to a year,
although some proceedings may be expedited. After the circuit court rules, the parties
may seek a hearing before the Supreme Court, which may hear the matter on a shortened
timetable. In rare situations, the Supreme Court may dispense with appellate review
altogether and hear a case straight from a district court. Consequently, all o f these
reviews cause significant delay, and these delays are to the benefit o f the persons being
investigated.
Although many o f the complaints aimed at the Independent Counsel
statute revolve around the time that the Independent Counsel spends investigating, and
the expenses incurred during that investigation, the assertion o f privileges by those being
investigated are a substantial factor in such time and expense. Although due process
allows the President and those on his behalf to assert these privileges, one has to wonder
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what the effect would be if every assertion o f privilege was heard on an expedited basis.
If justice were swift, would these investigations become more manageable, and
consequently more reasonable?
This chapter examines the privileges discussed above, as well as the
possibility o f prosecuting a sitting President. Each o f the privileges discussed has been
recently asserted in the Whitewater investigation and its related matters. Executive
privilege, the govemmental-attomey privilege, and the Secret Service “protective
ftmction privilege” have been asserted in the Monica Lewinsky investigation. The extent
o f the attomey-client privilege in the case o f a deceased client was raised in the
investigation o f White House Counsel Vince Foster’s suicide. All o f these privilege
issues have been or will be heard by the Supreme Court.

Executive Privilege
During Independent Counsel Starr’s investigation o f Monica Lewinsky,
Starr sought to compel the testimony o f Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal before the
grand jury. Bruce Lindsey is a deputy counsel with the White House and Sidney
Blumenthal was a journalist who is currently an advisor to the President and Mrs.
Clinton. Miss Lewinsky and others are being investigated for suborning perjury,
obstructing justice and/or intimidating witnesses concerning the Jones v Clinton sexual
harassment case.'** Both Lindsey and Bliunenthal allegedly had information relating to
whether federal crimes were committed by Lewinsky or others regarding the Jones v
Clinton case.'*’ Specifically, the Independent Counsel wanted to know whether the

'**

Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, sued President Clinton for sexual
harassment arising fi*om an incident which allegedly took place in a hotel room
while he was Governor o f Arkansas. The grant o f jurisdiction to the Independent
Counsel specifies this as the scope o f the investigation. See In re Madison
Guaranty Savings & Loan Assoc. (DC Cir Spec Div January 16, 1998).

'*’

Ms. Lewinsky filed an affidavit in the Jones case swearing that she never had
sexual relations with President Clinton. Contrary evidence came to the attention
...(continued)(continued...)
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President instructed Ms. Lewinsky to obstruct justice, if he suborned perjury by knowing
and encouraging her to file a false affidavit, or whether he discussed any instructions or
suggestions he may have made to her with either Lindsey or Blumenthal. If he had, it
would be highly relevant to the investigation.
Bruce Lindsey was called before the grand jury three times, on February
18,28, and on March 12, 1998. At each session, he asserted executive privilege in
response to several questions. He also asserted governmental attomey-client privilege.
Sidney Blumenthal appeared before the grand jury on February 26, 1998 and asserted
executive privilege on a number o f questions as well. He is not an attomey, thus the
attomey-client privilege was not available to him.
Starr moved to compel the testimony o f both men. In a detailed opinion,
the District Court granted his motion. The White House appealed, and Starr applied to
the Supreme Court for a writ to hear the issues immediately. In requesting the writ. Stanargued that the matter contained a question o f overriding concern, namely “the
circumstances under which the Executive Branch may withhold information from a
federal grand jury investigating allegations o f misconduct against the President, other
Executive Branch officials, and various private individuals.”

The Supreme Court

denied the application for an expedited hearing. The White House subsequently
abandoned its claim o f executive privilege as to both men, but retained its governmental

...(continued)

o f the Independent Counsel, and allegations were made that the President told Ms.
Lewinsky to lie, that he had friend and attomey Vemon Jordan take her to an
attomey to file the false affidavit, and that he had Jordan secure her a job at
Revlon Corporation in New York. Further allegations were made that Lewinsky
instructed her friend Linda Tripp to lie under oath about the alleged affair.
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attomey-client privilege claim as to Lindsey. An appeals court has agreed to hear the
Lindsey case at the end of June, 1998.'”
The guiding case on executive privilege is United States v Nixon.'^' In
Nixon, the Supreme Court addressed whether President Nixon could assert executive
privilege as to certain recorded conversations and documents relating to conversations
between himself and his advisors regarding the Watergate break-in. Balancing the need
for confidentiality among those in decision-making capacities and the need for
information relevant to a grand jury investigation, the Court acknowledged that there has
always been an understanding that some communications between high government
officials should be confidential. “Human experience teaches that those who expect public
dissemination o f their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appearances
and for their own interests to the detriment o f the decision-making process.” '” As an
example, the Court cited the meetings o f the Constitutional Convention in 1787, which
were conducted in complete privacy. The notes o f the meetings were kept confidential
for 30 years.'” However, the need for evidence in a pending grand jury investigation is
equally, sometimes more important that the President’s need for confidentiality.
Nixon argued that his privilege was and should be absolute, based on both
the need for confidentiality in Executive Branch decision-making and the independence
o f the Executive Branch under the Constitution.'” The Court concluded that the
President was entitled to the privilege, but not the absolute privilege Nixon sought. If the
asserted privilege was based on military or diplomatic secrets, the Court would grant the
utmost deference to the President, as it has done in the past. But in Nixon, the President
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asserted only a general interest in confidentiality. This alone would not suffice to render
a communication privileged. However, if the asserted general interest in confidentiality
related to the effective discharge o f the President’s powers, it would be constitutionally
based, but it would need to be weighed with the effect it has on the fair administration of
criminal justice.'” In Nixon’s case, his generalized interest in confidentiality did not
prevail over the fimdamental demands o f due process o f law in the fair administration o f
criminal justice. Thus, the Court held that “[t]he generalized assertion o f privilege must
yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” '”
Procedurally, the holding in United States v Nixon instituted a test: when a President
invokes executive privilege, the court must treat the subpoenaed material as
presumptively privileged and require the Special Prosecutor to show that the material is
essential to the justice o f the pending criminal case.'”
The District Court in the Lewinsky case followed the dictates o f the
Supreme Court and treated Lindsey and Blumenthal’s '” testimony as presumptively
privileged.'*" The District Court then analyzed the interest the President sought to
protect. Although purely personal conversations that did not touch on the President’s
constitutional duties or on policy decisions would not be covered by the privilege, many
private matters are discussed in the context o f official policymaking, and those
conversations would be covered. For example, the President’s discussions o f the
Lewinsky matter and how it would be handled when British Prime Minister Tony Blair
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visited the United States would be privileged.'*' The District Court could not classify the
conversations as purely personal, non-privileged communications, because it had sworn
statements from the White House that the conversations involved official matters such as
possible impeachment proceedings, foreign and domestic policy matters, and the
assertion o f official privileges.'*^ Unlike Nixon, where documents were involved and the
Court could examine the documents in camera to determine their content, the subject of
the Lewinsky motions was testimony. As such, the District Court had to treat the
testimony as presumptively privileged, requiring the Independent Counsel to make a
showing o f need.
In order to show need, the Independent Counsel must show: I ) that each discrete
group o f the subpoenaed materials likely contains important evidence; and 2) that this
evidence is not available with due diligence elsewhere. '*^ The District Court determined
that Starr had made such a showing, based in an in camera review of the evidence
gathered so far. The opinion does not detail the findings made by the District Court
discussing Starr’s showing of need, due to the confidentiality o f grand jury
proceedings.'*^ The District Court did comment, however, that if there were instructions
to obstruct justice or efforts to suborn perjury, they would likely take the form o f
conversations with close advisors, and may constitute some o f the most relevant evidence
in the investigation, whether exculpatory or inculpatory.'*’ Consequently, the motion
was granted.
The Lewinsky case seems an appropriate case in which to deny the use of
executive privilege. From the allegations made thus far, it stems from the personal
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conduct of the President, and his subsequent efforts to deal with his conduct. It would
not be difficult for the Independent Counsel to show need in such a situation. However,
the interesting questions begin when the investigation revolves around national security
or military issues. For example, both the Senate and the House are investigating dealings
between the Clinton Administration and the Chinese government which resulted in
assisting the Chinese in perfecting rocket launchers for nuclear weapons, and allowing
launches o f U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets.'** If an Independent Counsel is appointed,
surely his efforts to compel testimony on certain issues will invoke claims o f executive
privilege. Under Nixon, such claims may be successful.

Governmental Attomey-Client Privilege
In addition to asserting executive privilege, Bruce Lindsey asserted
governmental attomey-client privilege. The attomey-client privilege protects
communications between attorneys and their clients that are intended to be confidential
and are made for the purpose o f obtaining legal advice.'*’ As Deputy Counsel to the
Office o f the President, Lindsey claimed that he advised the President on how to keep
pending litigation from affecting his constitutional duties, whether or not to assert
privileges, and advised him with respect to potential impeachment proceedings. If
Lindsey had been Clinton’s private attomey, this information would unquestionably be
privileged. However, Lindsey is paid by the government, and there is an argument that
government attorneys work for the public, thus officials for whom they work should not
be able to claim the privilege to conceal information from the public.
Only one Court o f Appeal has explicitly held that a governmental
attomey-client privilege exists. However, it may not be asserted in grand jury
'**
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proceedings. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, '** the Eighth Circuit Court o f Appeals
addressed the private conduct o f President and Mrs. Clinton in the Whitewater matter.
The Independent Counsel had subpoenaed all documents created by government
attorneys related to the Whitewater matter, and the White House refused to produce some
o f its notes which were responsive to the subpoena, asserting a governmental attomeyclient privilege.'*’ The notes were taken during meetings between Mrs. Clinton, White
House attorneys, and her personal attomeys.'” The court ruled that while such a
privilege may exist in other circumstances, no privilege exists in a federal criminal
investigation.
The District Court in Lindsey’s case did not follow the reasoning o f the
Eighth Circuit and held that a governmental attomey-client privilege does apply in the
federal grand jury context. However, the privilege is not absolute in criminal cases, as it
is in civil cases. The court held that “in the context of a federal grand jury investigation
where one government agency needs information from another to determine if a crime
has been committed, the court finds that the governmental attomey-client privilege must
be qualified in order to balance the needs o f the criminal justice system against the
government agency’s need for confidential legal advice.'” The court compared the
attomey-client privilege to the executive privilege and concluded that the standard should
be the same. Absent such consistency, the President’s legal advisors will simply
recharacterize their legal advice as political advice in order to be evaluated under the
more lenient standard governing executive privilege. Consequently, for the same reasons
the court granted the Independent Counsel’s motion to compel based on executive
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privilege, it granted the Independent Counsel's motion based on the governmental
attomey-client privilege.
While abandoning its executive privilege claim, the White House is
pursuing its governmental attomey-client privilege claim. It seeks to overtum the holding
that the privilege is qualified, as the executive privilege, and establish the standard as
absolute in all contexts, including before a grand jury.

Attorney Client Privilege After Death
In another controversial move. Independent Counsel Starr brought a
motion before the court to compel disclosure o f three pages o f notes taken by Vince
Foster’s attomey while on the phone with Foster nine days before he committed suicide.
Starr believes the notes may assist in the investigation o f the White House travel office.'”
Foster’s lawyer refused to tum over the notes, and asserted the attomey-client privilege
on behalf o f his deceased client. The District Court ruled that the notes were privileged, a
ruling which was overtumed by the District o f Columbia Court of Appeals. The Supreme
Court overtumed the D C. Circuit, holding that the privilege remained intact.
In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Foster’s attomey argued that
the privilege should survive the client’s death, because to end the privilege at death would
chill discussion between a lawyer and client, especially a client who may be sick or close
to death. If a client knows that his communications with an attomey may be disclosed
after his death, he may not be honest with the attomey. Honesty is important in an
attomey-client relationship and confidentiality is what encourages that honesty and builds
a relationship o f trust. The attomey-client privilege exists in part to assure the client that
the attomey has his best interests in mind and will protect those interests. If the client
fears disclosure, he will not speak freely to the attomey. Starr’s office argued that their
'”
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need to review the notes outweighed any attomey-deceased-ciient privilege. The only
way to get to certain information would be by relaxing the privilege. Once a person dies,
there is no means for questioning him or her about the underlying events, which is a
subject the privilege does not protect.
The Supreme Court, in a six to three opinion, held that the privilege
remained intact. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas dissented. The Majority
reasoned that the majority o f cases addressing the privilege held or assumed that the
privilege remained intact after death. Although it may be waived in some testamentary
cases, the privilege is still presumed to exist. In the Foster case, the Court held, the
Independent Counsel did not show that the rule should be overtumed. Further, the
purpose behind the privilege weighed against disclosure to the Independent Counsel.'”
Consequently, Starr will not have access to Foster’s attomey’s notes.
The Dissent argued that exceptions to the privilege should be made when
there is a compelling law enforcement need for the information, and suggested that when
the privilege is asserted in the criminal context, and a showing is made that the
communications at issue contain necessary factual information not otherwise available, a
court should be permitted to determine whether the privilege should be forgone.'”

Protective Function Privilege
In the Monica Lewinsky investigation. Independent Counsel Starr seeks
the testimony o f several Secret Service agents who staff the President’s detail. The
Secret Service has instructed the involved agents not to answer certain questions, based
on what it calls the “protective function privilege.” Although no such privilege currently
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exists, the Secret Service is attempting to establish it.'” The Secret Service argues that
the proposed privilege should cover; 1) observations o f conduct, 2) overheard statements,
and 3) observations o f individuals made by Secret Service employees while performing a
protective function in proximity to the President. It would also extend to hearsay
communications o f privileged information, meaning actions or statements not personally
witnessed by the agent, but communicated to the agent by another person. The proposed
privilege would not need to be invoked by the President, but by the Secretary o f the
Treasury.'” The privilege would be absolute, with two exceptions: the first for
compelling circumstances, such as overriding national security concems, and the second,
where an officer or agent observes conduct or hears statements that are, at the time,
sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to conclude that a felony has been, is being, or
will be committed.'”
The reasoning behind this proposed privilege is that Secret Service agents
must be able to be close to the President at all times in order to protect him. If a President
believes his actions and conversations will not be protected, then he is likely to push the
agents away, creating substantial risk. Because the Secret Service uses a “cover and
evacuate” strategy rather than a “counter-offensive” strategy, the proposed privilege
becomes a matter of life and death. The “cover and evacuate” strategy means that the

'”
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Secret Service protects the President by forming an all-encompassing zone o f protection
on a twenty-four hour, three hundred and sixty-five days a year basis.” * It responds to an
attack by protecting and evacuating the President from the area, rather than shooting back
at the offender. For this reason, the lack o f close proximity could mean death.
Secret Service Director Merletti, in a declaration filed with the District
Court, stated the historical bases for the Secret Service’s position that close proximity is a
matter of life and death. In both the McKinley and Kennedy Assassinations, the Secret
Service believes that it could have saved the President by being only a few feet closer.
President McKinley was assassinated in 1901, at the Pan-American Exposition. A Secret
Service agent was supposed to be positioned directly next to McKinley in the public
receiving line. At the request o f the president o f the Pan-American Exposition, he was
positioned next to the President and the Secret Service agent was moved. Shortly after,
the President was shot at very close range, by a man who had a gun wrapped in a
handkerchief. The Secret Service believes it may have been able to save the President
had it been in closer proximity.”’ Similar circumstances existed with the Kennedy
Assassination. Usually, Secret Service agents would be positioned on the running board
o f the President’s limousine while it was traveling. At the instruction of the President,
the agents were ordered off o f the running boards on the fateful day o f his assassination.
The Secret Service believes it may have been able to prevent the assassination.™ In
contrast, when John Hinkley Jr. tried to assassinate President Reagan, agents were able to
immediately shield the President’s body and evacuate him from the situation.” '
According to Merletti, these examples show the importance of close proximity to the
President and the necessity for a President’s trust in the ability and discretion o f the
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agents on his detail. This trust would be compromised if an agent were compelled to
testify about what he saw and heard while protecting the President. As additional support
for its position, the Secret Service offered a letter written by Former President George
Bush, in which he supported their position that a President would be uncomfortable
having the agents nearby if the agents were forced to testify about what they might have
seen or heard. The potential for such testimony may damage the confidence the President
has in the discretion of the Secret service.™
The District Court granted Starr’s Motion to Compel, denying the claim of
protective function privilege and refusing to establish such a privilege. In evaluating
whether a new privilege should be established, a court must consider: 1) whether the
asserted privilege is historically rooted in federal law; 2) whether any states have
recognized the privilege; and 3) public policy interests.’" In this case, there is no history
of such a privilege, no state has recognized such a privilege, and the public policy interest
in such a privilege is not compelling.
The protective function privilege is not historically rooted in federal law.
In fact, no federal court has ever recognized such a privilege. Neither did Congress when
it enacted the statute which requires that the President and Vice President accept the
protection o f the Secret Service.™ To the contrary, the District Court reasoned. Congress
imposed a duty on all executive branch personnel to report criminal activity by
government officers and employees to the Attomey General, unless the Attomey General
directs otherwise.” ’
...(continued)
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Nor has any state ever recognized a protective function privilege. The
District Court considered this an important factor, stating “[t]he fact that every state has a
governor in need of protection and that no state has ever recognized a protective function
privilege provides a compelling reason for not creating the new privilege.”’”
Lastly, the District Court considered the public policy issues, which the Secret
Service argued extensively. While acknowledging that the President’s safety is o f
paramount national importance, the court did not accept the argument that the President
would be placed in greater peril if the Secret Service agents protecting him were able to
testify about what they saw and heard. “When people act within the law, they do not
ordinarily push away those they trust or rely upon for fear that their actions will be
reported to a grand jury.”’” The court cites instances when Secret Service agents have
written books and granted interviews o f their experiences, and says that there is no
indication that these instances have caused Presidents to push their protectors away.’"*
Furthermore, a Secret Service agent has a legal duty both as a government employee
under §535(b) and as a law enforcement officer to report criminal activity. Thus, the
policy arguments do not justify establishing such a privilege.
The White House appealed the District Court’s Order, and the Independent
Counsel applied for expedited hearing from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
denied the expedited hearing.

May a Sitting President be Prosecuted?
The investigation into Whitewater and the related Lewinsky matter raise
an important question: If the Independent Counsel finds that the President has committed
a crime, may he prosecute the President for that crime? The answer may be “no”. The
’"*
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Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.™
However, it says nothing about prosecuting a sitting president without bringing articles of
impeachment against him. Similarly, the Ethics in Government Act provides that the
Independent Counsel may send a report to Congress containing all evidence that
constitutes grounds for impeachment,’” but does not provide that the President may be
prosecuted for crimes absent impeachment. The Justice Department and others have
opined that impeachment is the only proceeding available to remove a President, both
because the Constitution provides that remedy and because the President has a “unique
role at the head o f the executive branch.”’"
However, a President may be civilly sued for private conduct. Public
officials generally have immunity from suit for money damages arising out o f their
official acts. It is supposed to enable certain officials to perform their jobs effectively
without worrying about personal liability arising from one o f their decisions. The
President has such immunity with regard to his official acts.’” But he does not have the
same immunity for unofficial acts.’” The immunity depends on the function performed,
not the identity o f the person who performed it.’” In Clinton v Jones, t h e Supreme
Court held 1) that the President is not granted temporary immunity from civil damages
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litigation arising out o f events that occurred before he took office, and 2) it is not
necessary to stay the trial o f the action until the President is out o f office.’”
Consequently, while the Independent Counsel may not prosecute the President until he
has been impeached and convicted by Congress, the government may possibly take civil
action against him for actions which are unofficial. The distinction between official and
unofficial while the President is in office is blurry, and legal battles are inevitable.
Further, the political consequences would prevent any such lawsuit and it is unclear who
could actually institute such an action. Thus, impeachment appears to be the only real
remedy available for a President who violates the law.

As shown by the discussion above, Starr’s investigation o f the Whitewater
affair and related matters has raised several controversial legal issues. The Clinton
Administration is taking full advantage o f the challenges these issues present, which
lengthens the investigation(s) considerably. If the only remedy against the President is
impeachment, then time is on his side. Given the time these challenges are taking, and
the additional time it would take for Congress to evaluate any report and institute
impeachment proceedings, this President will likely be out o f office. However, he could
be prosecuted for these crimes when out of office, unless pardoned by the next President.
In any case, if the President’s goal is to keep his Presidency intact until the next election,
he has a good chance o f success.
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CHAPTER 5

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

The foregoing Chapters have discussed the law which created the
Independent Counsel, its history, its constitutionality, policy changes throughout the
years, and the current issues which are making headlines. This Chapter seeks to analyze
The Act in terms o f its application. What problems arise during implementation and what
can Congress do to solve those problems? The press is full of criticism about the current
Independent Counsel investigation o f the Whitewater and Lewinsky matters, but much of
that is simply politics. However, there have been many real criticisms o f the provisions
of The Act which deserve discussion. The criticisms discussed here are divided into two
categories: statutory and overall. The statutory criticisms address problems that
Congress can either solve or improve upon by amending The Act. The second category
of criticisms address the overall value o f the statute, many o f which call for its repeal.
Finally, this Chapter will propose and discuss several solutions to the problems raised and
discuss whether The Act should and will be reauthorized.

Statutory Criticisms
There are six main criticisms o f The Act, which are categorized in the
following maimer: appointment o f the counsel, scope o f the investigation, time spent on
the investigation, cost o f the investigation, removal o f the counsel, and concurrent
Congressional investigations.
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Appointment
The main criticism directed at the appointment of the Independent Counsel
is that the standard is too easy to meet. As discussed earlier, in order to commence a
preliminary investigation, the Attomey General needs specific and credible information
that a covered official has committed a federal crime. Once the preliminary investigation
is over, imless the Attomey General determines that no further investigation is warranted,
she must appoint an Independent Counsel. But she is handicapped by her inability to use
the normal tools of a prosecutor, such as the subpoena power. The ease with which a
counsel may be appointed has created too many investigations, the most recent example
being the appointment of an Independent Counsel to investigate Labor Secretary Alexis
Herman.

Secretary Herman is alleged to have received commissions

on the value o f work she assisted a certain businessman in obtaining, by using her
connections as a White House Official. The businessman, Laurent J. Yene, claims that he
agreed to pay her a 10% commission on any profits his company made with her
assistance during the period 1995 through 1996. The Justice Department, after initial
investigation, believes that Yene’s company made about $45,000 from this business,
which would have entitled Herman to $4,500.’” Despite the small amount o f alleged
gains, the Attomey General was forced to request an Independent Counsel. In Reno's
request to the Special Division, she discussed the efforts made to investigate the
allegations, which included reviewing many documents and conducting over one hundred
interviews. The investigation uncovered some financial transactions which may have
corroborated Yéné’s testimony. Consequently, Reno concluded she had reasonable
grounds to believe further investigation was warranted. However, she stated in the
request “[a]Ithough our investigation has developed no evidence clearly demonstrating

Attomey General Janet Reno, Application to the Court Pursuant to 28 USC
§592(C)(1) fo r the Appointment o f an Independent Counsel May 21, 1998,
reprinted at http://www.courttv.com/librarv/govemment/herman.html.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62
Secretary Herman’s involvement in these matters, and substantial evidence suggesting
that she may not have been Involved, a great deal o f Yene’s story has been corroborated;
we thus are unable to conclude that he is not credible. This, coupled with the strictures
and limited investigative tools available under The Act, have led me to conclude that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted, in order to
determine whether Secretary Herman violated any federal criminal law other than a Class
B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.”” * Although Reno had no conclusive evidence that
Herman was involved in illegal activities, she still had to request the appointment of an
Independent Counsel. This criticism is further reinforced by the appointment o f six other
Independent Counsels since August o f 1994.” ’

Scope o f Investigation
Many criticisms are directed at the scope o f the counsel’s investigation, in
terms of power, subjects, and crimes. The Independent Counsel has unlimited power,
which is focused on one cause. He has the resources and authority of the Attomey
General, yet only himself to impose limits. Former Independent Counsel Jacob Stein,
now attomey for Monica Lewinsky, is quoted as saying, “1 was astonished at the
authority I had, and I felt it was a personal test o f my own sanity in the exercise o f that
authority. I don’t know whether others thought that I passed the test. But I had more
authority than anybody should have.”” " Some former Independent Counsels believe that
if you put too many checks on the Independent Counsel, he will not be truly

318

Attorney General Janet Reno, Application to the Court Pursuant to 28 USC
§592(C)(l) fo r the Appointment o f an Independent Counsel May 21,1998,
reprinted at http://www.courttv.com/librarv/govemment/herman.html.

219

The current counsels are investigating Bmce Babbitt, Henry Cisneros, Mike Espy,
and the Clintons. Past counsels investigated Ron Brown and Eli Segal.
Independent Counsels at a Glance, Washington Post, May 26, 1988 via
http://www.washinetonpost.com.

220

Wilkinson and Ellis, 1549-50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
independent.” ' Others, including Lawrence Walsh, claim there are already at least two
checks on the Independent Counsel; the Special Division’s grant o f jurisdiction and the
Attorney General’s power to remove the Independent Counsel for cause.’” Although the
first check is often been challenged by defense counsel, the second has yet to be
exercised.
In addition to unlimited power during the investigation, the Independent
Counsel appears to be able to investigate almost anyone. His authority is not limited to
those who are named in his grant o f jurisdiction, nor those who are covered officials
under The Act. Without considering the referral jurisdiction. The Act already covers too
many officials. The history o f The Act indicates that it is concerned with the very highest
level o f government officials. The Act’s provision allowing for referral o f related matters
then allows the Independent Counsel to bring people into the investigation who may not
even be government officials and who have absolutely no connection with the original
crime being investigated. For example, the Monica Lewinsky investigation was deemed
a related matter to the Jones v Clinton case, which was a related matter to the Whitewater
investigation. They are all connected by the Clinton Administration’s alleged efforts to
encourage wimesses to lie. However. Monica Lewinsky is not one o f the officials
covered by The Act, nor should she be. She has no relationship to the Whitewater land
deals, yet now she is the subject of a grand jury investigation where she may be indicted
and tried for covering up an alleged affair with the President. The scope o f those who are
subject to investigation is virtually limitless.
The last criticism directed at the scope o f The Act is that it covers too
many crimes. Currently, one can be investigated for any federal crime which is not a
Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction. However, the genesis o f the statute was the
221
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firing o f a special prosecutor who was investigating the President’s involvement in the
burglary o f the Democratic National Headquarters, and its subsequent cover-up. The
Watergate break-in was a textbook example o f a President abusing his power as
President, and using his office to engage in criminal activity. The crimes currently being
investigated do not reach that level o f criminality. Rather, they are often political
questions which become criminalized. If the President had intimate relations with a
White House intern, is that a criminal matter or a political matter? The fact that he may
have encouraged her to lie may make it a criminal matter, but it is arguably not a proper
line o f inquiry for an Independent Counsel. Is Labor Secretary Herman’s alleged profit o f
$4,500 enough to justify an investigation that may cost millions? What about the
investigation o f Hamilton Jordan for alleged drug use? Some o f these investigations may
be better left to the Justice Department, while others may be better left to the press and
the President’s political opponents. The country’s resources should be spent
investigating the truly serious crimes.

Time Spent
As discussed. Independent Counsel investigations can take years to
complete, and most do. Several of the current investigations have been ongoing since
1994 and 1995, namely the investigations o f Mike Espy, the Clintons, and Henry
Cisneros. Lawrence Walsh’s investigation spanned seven years. The Act does not limit
the time spent investigating, although the Special Division is required to review whether
the counsel’s investigation should be terminated after 2 years, and then every year
thereafter. This is not a limit on time, because, as previously mentioned, the investigation
can only be terminated when all prosecutions are substantially completed. If the
investigation is still ongoing, the Special Division does not have the power to terminate
it.
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In response to such criticism, former Independent Counsel Larry
Thompson claims that limiting a counsel’s investigation is an unrealistic proposal
because the counsel is investigating criminal activity, which generally includes cover-ups
o f relevant information, and possibly obstruction o f justice.™ Lawrence Walsh agrees,
noting that the Independent Counsel is pitted against some o f the best defense counsel in
the country, many of which are well-versed in diversionary tactics. In some cases, Walsh
comments, the Independent Counsel is up against those in government who are welltrained at hiding information. For example, in the Iran-Contra investigation, Walsh was
up against the CIA, who are known to produce a hundred thousand documents and hold
back the ten that explain the hundred thousand.’” However, the time engulfed by these
investigations damages those involved, and at some point will exceed the public interest
in the investigation altogether.

Cost o f Investigation
With Lawrence Walsh’s investigation topping forty-seven million dollars
and most costing somewhere in the millions, the cost o f investigations is frequently
criticized. Although the counsel is subject to audits and a member o f his staff must
certify all expenditures made, the supposed controls do not seem to make a difference.
The public hears only about the millions o f dollars being spent during the investigations,
and has no choice but to believe it is a waste o f money. There is very little effort to
explain to the public why it costs so much to investigate, nor are the audit results
publicized to provide more information. When millions are spent and the evidence
gathered is withheld, criticism is inevitable.

Ibid., 1550.
Ibid.
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Removal o f the Counsel
Many believe that the Attorney General’s power to remove the
Independent Counsel for cause is illusory. Politically, it is untenable, because any action
the Attorney General takes towards removing the counsel will be attributed to the
administration being investigated and seen as an attempt to obstruct justice. Legally, the
Attorney General has no precedent to guide her in determining good cause. Is good cause
leaking information learned in a grand jury proceeding to the press, as some have alleged
o f Independent Counsel Starr? Perhaps, but it may require yet another investigation to
determine if good cause exists. Consequently, the Attorney General’s power to remove
the counsel for good cause is no power at all.

Concurrent Congressional Investigations
Congress has the power to conduct its own investigations and has been
doing so for over two hundred years. Since 1792, Congress has been investigating
matters of public interest, such as the failed Sinclair expedition, where American Soldiers
were killed by Native Americans in the Northwest Territory,"’ the Teapot Dome Scandal,
Watergate, Iran Contra, and Whitewater, and most recently illegal campaign
contributions. Sometimes, Congress investigates the same matter as an Independent
Counsel. Concurrent investigations mainly cause problems for the Independent Counsel,
and The Act does not address this situation. For example, Lawrence Walsh’s
investigation o f Iran Contra overlapped with Congress’ hearings on Iran Contra and it
was Walsh’s investigation that suffered. Although the Congressional attorneys handling
the House and Senate investigations tried to cooperate with Walsh, their objectives
differed and problems arose with witnesses and documents. The biggest problem Walsh
had was Congress’ grant o f immunity to many o f those involved in the arms for hostages
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transactions. Once Congress grants immunity, it is difficult for the Independent Counsel
to secure a conviction, because the information the immunized party gives cannot be used
against him, absent certain exceptions. Congress’ grant o f immunity to those involved in
the Iran Contra affair really damaged Walsh’s investigation and led to the overturning o f
several convictions. Although this problem may not seem as crucial as some o f the
others mentioned, it rendered much o f the time and resources spent on the Iran Contra
investigation useless.

Overall Criticisms
The Act as a whole is criticized for creating a monster - an investigator
with unlimited power, no checks and balances, focused in on one target. The question is
not whether he will hit this target, but when and who will he bring down with his target.
It is, many claim, a witch hunt. Former Independent Counsel Jacob Stein put it this way:
"‘Whatever the starting point, the matter in hand spreads out and out, encompassing ever
vaster horizons, and if it were permitted to go further and further in every direction, it
would end by embracing the entire universe.”"*
In addition to ever-expanding, the “witch hunt” becomes partisan. The
Act is used by the political party which is not in the White House to attack the party
which is. Justice Scalia made reference to this in his dissent in Morrison v Olson.
Further, the party that is being investigated inevitably accuses the other o f conspiring
with the Independent Counsel, implicating the counsel, the Special Division, members of
Congress, and our judicial system. Lawyers for the accused fuel the fire, even attacking
the counsel personally, as if he were running for a hotly contested political office.
Finally, the investigation attracts an undue amount o f attention from the
media. Allegations o f high-level officials engaging in criminal conduct, especially when
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it relates to sexual misconduct, are front-page stories. For example, for the past seven
months, the airwaves have been bombarded with stories about the Lewinsky matter.
Inevitably, the matter grows in stature while other foreign and domestic policy matters
suffer.
These overall criticisms lead to the observation that we would be better
served by repealing The Act and allowing the Attorney General to appoint special
prosecutors, as was the case before The Act. Consequently, critics argue, if the President
wanted to remove a prosecutor, he would be deterred by fear o f public reproval or
impeachment, but would not be limited by statute."’

Statutory Solutions

Appointment and Removal
In order to solve the problems associated with appointing and removing
the Independent Counsel, the Attorney General must be given more discretion. In
particular, when the Attorney General evaluates a request for an Independent Counsel,
she should be allowed to weigh the seriousness o f the alleged crime and the cost involved
in conducting an independent investigation. Although some would argue that the current
restrictions ensure that the Attorney General will not exert undue influence on the
investigation, we have seen that such minimal discretion leads to unnecessary
investigations. In addition, the standard for requesting appointment after the preliminary
investigation has been conducted should be raised. The current standard o f “reasonable
grounds to believe further investigation is warranted” should be raised to something akin
to a “probable cause to believe a crime was committed” standard. In investigating the
allegations, the Attorney General should be permitted to use subpoenas to compel
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testimony and documents. Consequently, if an Independent Counsel is appointed, it will
be for good cause.
In addition to raising the appointment standard, the removal standard
should be defined. The removal provisions in The Act should be amended to specify
what good cause means. Suggestions include: violating the Rules o f Professional
Conduct, abusing prosecutorial power, making false statements, and exceeding specified
time limits. These types o f limits would make the counsel more accountable and give the
Attomey General a standard to rely on so that a counsel who abuses his power may be
reigned in.

Scope
The scope o f The Act should be restricted to fewer officials and far fewer
crimes. One suggestion is to limit the coverage o f The Act to the President, Vice
President, Cabinet Officials, and Campaign Officials. Lower-level Executive Branch
officials and members of Congress do not need to be included in The Act. There are
others who can and have investigated them with success.
The crimes within the scope o f The Act should be narrowed to very
serious ones, such as those which relate to the functioning o f the office and the power
vested in it. An abuse o f power or misuse o f office for financial or political gain are
examples of crimes which should be covered. Failed land deals, casual drug use, or
sexual antics are not crimes which an Independent Counsel should investigate.

Time Limits
In response to criticisms about the length of investigations, either the term
o f the Independent Counsel should be limited to two years or 30 months, at most, or a
full-time Independent Counsel should be appointed to handle all investigations. The
former Independent Counsels who have suggested self-imposed time limits may think
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that these suggested limits are arbitrary, but at some point an investigation loses its value.
Walsh’s investigation outlasted the administration he was investigating. A full-time
counsel would impose similar limits on the person inhabiting that office as a normal
prosecutor faces— limited time, resources, and several ongoing investigations. This
proposed solution may provide the counsel with some perspective, which would diminish
the “witch-hunt” quality of current investigations.

Cost
In addition to imposing a time limit, imposing real cost controls would
improve the image of the investigation and provide a more efficient means to implement
The Act. If the counsel had a budget, he would have to make the same prosecutorial
decisions as other prosecutors, specifically who to pursue with the resources available.
The counsel could not then spin an endless web because he would not have the funds to
do so.

Concurrent Congressional Investigation
The only real solution to the Congressional investigation problem is to
limit Independent Counsel investigations when a Congressional investigation is ongoing,
or force Congress to consult the Independent Counsel before granting immunity to
witnesses. The Independent Counsel should not be appointed in situations where a
Congressional inquiry will serve a greater good, such as in the campaign contribution
matter, where a large number o f people may have made illegal contributions and the
inquiry reveals a whole system of wrongdoing, rather than one or two high-level officials
who have broken the law.
In sum, these proposed statutory solutions will tailor The Act to what its
original purpose was, namely to appoint an independent person to investigate the few
matters that the Justice Department cannot.
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Overall Solutions
In response to the overall criticisms o f The Act, making the proposed
statutory solutions would change the perception o f it. The Independent Counsel would
only be appointed when very high-level officials have committed a serious crime which
implicates the office as well as the person. Investigations would be limited and more
efficient and the public would be better informed. The Office o f the Independent Counsel
would come to be known as a serious office designed to enforce the maxim that no man
or woman is above the law.
Part o f the overall solution is for the counsel to inform the public o f how
The Act works, what he is spending the public’s money on, and what success he has had.
For example, Donald Smaltz, Independent Counsel investigating Mike Espy, has a web
page."* The page gives a history o f the investigation, the contact address of the counsel’s
office, as well as providing copies o f documents, including: the Attomey General’s
request for appointment o f an Independent Counsel, the Special Division’s order
appointing the Independent Counsel, the twelve indictments and one civil complaint filed
to date, the press releases issued by the counsel, the counsel’s three annual reports to
Congress, and the text o f testimony and speeches delivered by the counsel. This is a great
way to communicate with people about the counsel’s activities. Each counsel should be
required to have one.
The Act itself is not likely to be repealed in 1999, nor should it be. Even if
it was repealed and the Attomey General appointed special prosecutors as she saw fit, we
would see many o f the same problems. There would still exist pressure regarding
removal, there would still be substantial resources expended, and the administration
would still attack the special prosecutor as partisan. In response to questions about The
Act’s repeal. Senator Henry Hyde recently commented “I can’t predict what is going to
228
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happen in the coming year, but my guess would be that we will reauthorize an
Independent Counsel statute..
The fact is that we do not have the one attribute which would render the
Independent Counsel statute unnecessary—trust. In Hyde’s words, “[t]he fact is, human
nature is human nature. I wouldn’t have trusted Ed Meese to prosecute Ronald Reagan
and 1 don’t trust Janet Reno to prosecute Bill Clinton.”’’" Hyde’s lack o f trust is shared
by many. The deficiencies in The Act can be cured, but the principle behind it cannot.
We need an independent person to investigate high-level government officials because
they caimot be trusted to fairly investigate themselves. If that ever changes, then there
will be no need for a counsel and The Act should be repealed. But change is not
forthcoming.
For now, the Independent Counsel serves an important function. It stands for the
proposition that no one is above the law, although in practice it may not always live up to
that proposition. Changes in The Act may bring a sense o f justice to the office which it
currently lacks. The lessons o f Watergate have not been forgotten, nor have they been
proven needless, but they do need to be addressed in a fair, just manner. The Office of
the Independent Counsel can be a fair, just office if properly reformed.

Wilkinson and Ellis, 1597.
Ibid.
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